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For Empire or Dominion? Prestige or Adventure? 




In May 1929, the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) formalized diplomatic ties 
with Japan by opening its Tokyo legation. Although the third of its kind, Canada's Tokyo 
legation initiated and managed bi-lateral relations with a degree of autonomy unparalleled by 
those in Washington and Paris. Within this newfound autonomous space was room for each of 
Canada's diplomats to negotiate, internalize, and perform their roles differently. This thesis 
investigates how and why First Secretary Hugh Keenleyside, Minister Herbert Marler, and 
Second Secretary Kenneth Kirkwood – the vanguards of Canadian national self-representation in 
the Pacific – engaged and employed that personal and national autonomy, studying their 
reactions to and participation in transnational political and cultural exchanges at the imperial 
Japanese capital. Their dissimilar experiences meanwhile act to demonstrate the complexities of 
those exchanges and highlight the various motives and opinions prevalent amongst Canada's 
late-interwar social political, and intellectual elite. 
 By adopting the perspectives of the individual as its primary subject of analysis, this 
study contributes to an extant literature that has regularly portrayed the DEA and its foreign 
offices as unitary practitioners of a singular ideology or policy. Furthermore, the individual 
voices of Canada's first ranking official in the Japanese capital are recovered from the silencing 
effect of top-down, national-political analyses that have so dominated the field. Finally, it 
eschews teleological readings of the period preoccupied with Europe, a North Atlantic Triangle, 
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For decades, the conclusion of the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference, and the 
resultant Treaty of Versailles have been centrepieces in the history of Canadian political 
autonomy. Indeed, it was only after their contributions of human life and supplies in that great 
conflict that the British territories were provided equal status within the empire, culminating in 
the Balfour Declaration of 1926 which established the principle of equality within the 
Commonwealth. Uncertainty regarding Canadian foreign policy remained into the late-interwar 
period, however, and it was not until Canada opened its own foreign offices at Washington, D.C. 
and Paris that the tension between imperial authority and dominion autonomy in international 
relations was truly tested.1 Observers in England as well as Canada continued, as English Prime 
Minister Lloyd George had in 1921, to see "the instrument of the foreign policy of the Empire" 
as entirely that of "the British Foreign Office."2 Meanwhile, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King, together with his new Under Secretary of State for External Affairs Oscar D. Skelton, 
sought to challenge this system by building for Canada its own, self-interested and self-serviced 
diplomatic service and foreign policy. Following the opening of Canada's first two foreign 
legations in 1928, however, tensions between Ottawa's careful autonomists and outright 
imperialists smothered the effectiveness of the diplomats stationed there, limiting their ability 
(and, in some cases, desire) to act entirely in the interest of Canada.3 The establishment of 
Canada's Washington and Paris legations thus did little to change the established order which, 
since before Confederation in 1867, saw British foreign offices in charge of all imperial external 
policy as well as the management of the affairs of Canadians abroad. 
                                                 
1
 Historian H. Gordon Skilling points to the words of British Prime Minister Lloyd George who in 1921 declared in 
the British House: "Since the War the Dominions have been given equal rights with Great Britain in the control of 
the foreign policy of the Empire […] The machinery is the machinery of the British Government – the Foreign 
Office, the Ambassadors. The machinery must remain here." Equal rights within empire, he stressed, meant not that 
each now had the right to reach out and form new and unique bi-lateral arrangements with foreign states. Instead, it 
meant that while "the sole control of British foreign policy is now vested in the Empire a whole," the actual, 
working advantage was that "joint control mean[t] joint responsibility" at a time when "the burden of Empire ha[d] 
become so vast." Great Britain, House of Commons, 14 December, 1921, quoted in H. Gordon Skilling, Canadian 
Representation Abroad: From Agency to Embassy (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1945), xiv. 
2
 Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroad, xiv. 
3
 Canadian foreign policy and affairs were conducted abroad until the Second World War by legations which, 
headed by ministers plenipotentiary, were a rank lower than embassies and ambassadors.  
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 In 1929, however, the Canadian Department of External Affairs opened its third legation 
abroad. Turning away from the Anglo-American dominated Atlantic world, King and Skelton 
pursued plans for a diplomatic mission to the Japanese imperial capital of Tokyo. While the 
Tokyo legation shared some features with the young Dominion's two extant foreign offices, 
Canada's only legation in the Pacific initiated and managed bi-lateral relations there with a 
degree of autonomy unparalleled by those in Washington and Paris. Nearly ten thousand 
kilometres from the overlapping and hegemonic Anglo-American influences at the two 
aforementioned capitals, the Canadians at Tokyo enjoyed freedoms in their professional as well 
as personal lives. As this thesis will show, this influenced the ways they were able to represent 
their nation amongst the diverse diplomatic corps of foreign elite, as well as a wider Japanese 
public largely unaware of Canada's colonial and imperial history. Within these fluid political and 
constitutional circumstances, Canadian diplomats established for their nation a place in East Asia 
and, by extension, the global sphere of diplomacy and foreign policy by asserting and exercising 
individual autonomy in operations at Tokyo fully two years before the Statue of Westminster 
codified the dominions' ability to do so.  
 It was only because of the work of Under Secretary of State Oscar D. Skelton that the 
very opportunity to negotiate and pursue a distinctly Canadian policy abroad was realized. 
Nevertheless, the actual negotiation and exertion of that autonomy was entirely up to the three 
ranking Canadian diplomats assigned to Tokyo, the three men whose work and lives are at the 
heart of this study. The disparate experiences of these individuals demonstrate the complexities 
of the international exchanges made at Tokyo, while highlighting the various motives and 
reactions prevalent amongst Canada's social and intellectual elite during the late-interwar period. 
External's newest first secretary in 1929 was Hugh L. Keenleyside, a trained historian and former 
professor at the University of British Columbia. Keenleyside arrived in Tokyo ahead of his 
minister and colleagues in May, 1929. Later that summer, Canada's first appointed minister to 
Japan, Herbert Meredith Marler, arrived from Montreal. Though he had left behind his successful 
law firm, Marler & Marler, as well as his impressive estates and social connections, he brought 
with him to Tokyo the material and social privileges he enjoyed as the patrician head of one of 
Quebec's most prominent families. Travelling alongside him was Kenneth Porter Kirkwood, 
third secretary and, like Keenleyside, a postgraduate scholar and published academic. Just as 
their operation of the legation was afforded certain administrative freedoms, so too were their 
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personal politics and philosophies given room to be tested and applied amongst themselves in 
their newly adopted home. Their personal accounts reflect episodes of friction and clashes of 
ideals occurring when, for example, the paternalistic, racialized perspectives of one conflicted 
with the humanistic universalism of another. 
 Thus, as the experiences of Marler, Keenleyside, and Kirkwood demonstrate, there was 
room within their newly carved-out spaced in Tokyo for each to negotiate, internalize, and 
perform his role differently. Far from insisting on a unitary effort, the three held disparate views 
regarding their nation's policies. Moreover, the Canadians in Tokyo each had distinct 
conceptions of individual purpose and responsibility there. From 1929, the Department of 
External Affairs, staffed by Skelton's selection of the best educated and most 'cultured,' worldly 
civil servants, therefore operated an institution in Tokyo that exerted a form of national 
autonomy in foreign relations hitherto unprecedented in the history of the Dominion. Taken 
together, meanwhile, their work – however differently understood by each of the men 
individually – represented the first official demonstration of Canadian autonomy and national 
identity in East Asia.  
 By studying the alternatively similar and dissimilar experiences of these individuals, a 
chapter of international history hitherto interpreted by historians in terms of economic growth 
and immigration numbers can be shown to have in fact incorporated a much more complicated 
set of interpersonal processes.4 The private accounts of these diplomats are coloured by a number 
of pressures emanating from the Canadian capital of which the men at Tokyo were repeatedly 
reminded. Indeed, the top priority of the legation in 1929 was the question of Japanese 
immigration to Canada, King's plans to open the legation having been born of these very 
concerns.5 As historian John Price has argued, there was also the Prime Minister's familiarity 
                                                 
4
 These interpretations centered upon the policies and agreements made between governments at Ottawa and Tokyo, 
downplaying any explanations of the legation, the processes of its opening, or the experiences of its staff in favour 
of national, political perspectives. Skilling provided one example characteristic of this reductionist view in 1945 
when he wrote: "the motive for its [the Tokyo legation's] creation was primarily that of giving added support and 
encouragement to the export trade with the entire Orient, and to Canadian financial interest in Japan." There was 
also the matter of "the regulation of Japanese immigration to Canada, especially the viséing of passports of 
prospective immigrants." For Skilling, as for many subsequent academics across a number of disciplines, policy was 
the starting point as well as the ending point of analysis. Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroad: From Agency 
to Embassy, 242. 
5
 As described in cables sent between the Dominions office at London and Skelton's in Ottawa, the target for the 
Tokyo legation was bi-lateral "co-operation in limitation" of Japanese immigration to Canada. Dominions Secretary 
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with Japan which, together with his political and economic interests, made Tokyo an ideal site 
for a third foreign office.6 Still, however important in the minds of British Columbians still 
pointing to the 'yellow peril' of cheap Asian labour in 1929, the immigration question itself was 
more apparent than real.7 Meanwhile, Marler elevated the cause of Canadian export and trade, 
making it his pet project for his six years in Tokyo, delegating the many other tasks of his office 
to his junior staff.  
 The most important and lasting legacy of the Tokyo legation, however, relates to the 
introduction and demonstration of intra-Imperial differentiation of Commonwealth states. Indeed, 
this was a central motivator for King and Skelton's earliest desires for an expanded Department 
of External Affairs. Selling their efforts to imperialists in the Conservative party as a way to 
relieve British officials abroad of duties pertaining more exclusively to Canadian interests, their 
plan was realized during External's recruitment cycles of 1927 and 1928.8 Skelton then 
                                                                                                                                                             
to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 22 December 1927; Dominions Secretary to Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, 19 January, 1928. Both in Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 4, 33-4. See also: John 
D. Meehan, The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-1941 (Vancouver and Toronto: 
UBCPress, 2004), 9-10. 
6
 The Prime Minister no doubt respected Japan's imperial status. Price also notes that "hopes for trade were also 
significant in [the Prime Minister's] decision to open a legation, but his desire to enforce exclusion through passport 
and visa controls in Tokyo came first." This, Price continues, "reflects the institutionalization of state racism during 
this era" – itself a part of those secondary or even tertiary concerns influencing his government's decision to move 
into the region. He draws the following quote from King's 1927 diary to demonstrate this point: "It seems to me that 
our only effective way to deal with the Japanese question is to have our own Minister in Japan to vise passports. 
This will be the only way to meet the Tory policy of 'exclusion' which we can never consent." John Price, Orienting 
Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific (Vancouver: UBCPress, 2011),  30-1; William Lyon Mackenzie King, 
The Diaries of W.L. Mackenzie King (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) 18 October, 1927, quoted in Price, 
Orienting Canada, 31. 
7
 Historian John Hilliker demonstrates the falsity of nativist British Columbian fears more directly, noting that in 
1934 only 55 Japanese arrived on Canadian shores, a decrease not initiated by any effort of the legation staff at 
Tokyo. John Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume I, The Early Years, 1909-1946 (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 162. 
8
 It was with great professionalism that, as civil servant, Skelton kept his views, as well as his operation of the 
Department of External Affairs, nonpartisan. Like both his predecessor and successor, the Under Secretary's term 
spanned Liberal and Conservative governments, though he was always closer with King. Regarding his recruiting 
campaign and 'push' for expanded representation abroad, Hilliker explains that "while Skelton had tried to recruit 
candidates committed to the idea of dominion autonomy, there was otherwise no uniformity of opinion on political, 
social, and economic matters. These varied from radical to conservative; Skelton's methods of recruiting had tested 
not so much the point of view as the ability to express and to defend it well." Hilliker, Canada's Department of 
External Affairs: Volume I, 123; there were of course those who saw in his requests to both the Prime Minister's 
office at Ottawa and the Dominion Office at London the products of Liberal- as well as nationalist ideology but, 
when challenged, he accepted the limitations placed upon him by his position and authority. On Skelton's 
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successfully attracted his ideal candidates – namely, Canadians with graduate degrees taken 
abroad.9 Together with two of Canada's newest scholar-diplomats, Marler was tasked with 
introducing and explaining the Dominion's status and role to not only Japanese populations in 
Tokyo, but also to a number of representatives from elsewhere who found their assumptions of 
British Imperial political structures challenged by the presence of Canadians with diplomatic 
authority. For Canadian and British representatives now living and working as neighbours in 
foreign capitals, the first and most frequent order of business was to assure their host 
governments and various international observers that, despite the arrival of Canadian 
representatives, there was no disunity or fracturing within their Empire.10 
 By focusing on the experiences of these three men, I will propose an alternative view of 
Canadian diplomacy in interwar East Asia by highlighting the fluid autonomy enjoyed on both 
the institutional as well as individual level. Arriving in Tokyo during the summer of 1929, these 
Canadians became a part of a worldwide performance of Imperial identity and authority, while at 
the same time introducing and representing their national and personal identities to Japan and the 
world. Subsumed within political negotiations at the national level, then, was a more diverse set 
of processes of identity formation and performance among the very individuals who, as a group, 
represented and operationalized their respective nations in Tokyo. The personal papers of these 
men provide a fascinating window into this realm, illuminating the unique and exclusive 
environment inhabited by the first Canadian diplomats at Tokyo in the late-twenties and early-
thirties.11 
                                                                                                                                                             
autonomism and the structures of authority within which he negotiated and deployed it, see: Norman Hillmer, O.D. 
Skelton: A Portrait of Canadian Ambition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015): especially chapters 7 and 8. 
9
 Hilliker explains that the under secretary's preferred candidates would have gained "more varied education" and 
the "experience of living in an unfamiliar cultural setting" as graduate students abroad. Hilliker, Canada's 
Department of External Affairs: Volume I, 120. On Skelton's efforts to "democratize" this recruitment process, as 
well as the general aims and more specific logistics of his 1927 and 1928 hiring campaigns, see: Hillmer, O.D. 
Skelton, 162-5. 
10
 One characteristic and oft-repeated interpretation described how, while Vincent Massey now represented 
Canadian interests at Washington, his presence was merely to address those "local questions" unique to Canadian 
society and markets "in order that the harmony, and so the strength, of the whole may be preserved for the larger 
occasions when common action is needed." The London Times, 28 September, 1926, quoted in Skilling, Canadian 
Representation Abroad, 215. 
11
 Indeed the diplomatic community at Tokyo during these years was almost entirely self-made and self-sufficient. 
Goto-Shibata quotes from British Ambassador John Tilley's The Foreign Office: "It must be remembered that the 
idea that diplomats are constantly entertained by the people of the country where they live is generally speaking, 
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 Recent developments in the field of historical biography guide both the analysis and 
presentation of this study of Canadian diplomats at the Tokyo legation. Built upon the 
achievements of historians in the fields of social and cultural as well as feminist and gender 
history, 'new biography' accounts for and indeed demonstrates how individual personality at once 
moulds and at the same is moulded by culture. Taking the "individual as the 'text' and the 
surrounding culture as the 'context,'" as Lois Banner explains, "it follows that the individual 'text' 
not only reflects the 'context' but also influences it."12 Thus the experiences of Keenleyside, 
Marler, and Kirkwood can illuminate not only the histories of three individuals, but also the 
institutions, nations, and cultures with which they came into contact. As the subject of analysis 
then, the individual is not "studied for its own sake, but as evidence that could provide a different 
path into the past," as Alice Kessler-Harris has posited. Indeed, the present study is in many 
ways inspired by her claim that "an individual life might help us to see not only into particular 
events" – the opening of Canada's first diplomatic mission to Japan and East Asia, for example – 
"but into the larger cultural and social and even political processes of a moment in time."13   
 Adopting the experience and perspectives of these men, the present study challenges an 
existing literature that has framed the Department of External Affairs as a unitary practitioner of 
a singular ideology or policy.14 It thus aims to reveal how and why these individuals influenced 
and, in turn, were themselves influenced by the transpacific, transnational political and cultural 
                                                                                                                                                             
entirely fictitious. [… A]part from official entertainment, it is only in the English-speaking capitals that people 
habitually entertain, even each other, in the own diplomatic houses. […] Diplomats, therefore, depend chiefly on 
each other for society." Sir John Tilley and Stephen Gaslee, The Foreign Office (London: G. P. Putnam's Sons Ltd., 
1933), 258, quoted in Harumi Goto-Shibata, "Sir John Tilley: Ambassador to Japan, 1926-31," in British Envoys in 
Japan, 1859-1972, edited by Hugh Cortazzi, et al. (Kent: Global Oriental, 2004), 129. 
12
 Lois W. Banner, "Biography as History," in The American Historical Review vol. 114, no. 3 (June, 2009), 581-2. 
13
 Alice Kessler-Harris, "Why Biography?," in The American Historical Review vol. 114, no. 3 (June, 2009), 626. 
14
 Shared, hegemonic processes of self-identification, as well as processes through which an identification or 
attempted understanding of the native 'Other' was procured by Canadians in Tokyo (and beyond), must also be 
considered when critically assessing these individuals' perspectives. In these instances I draw upon Edward Said to 
contextualize, historicize, and plot the assumptions and prejudices that appear within the historical record left by 
each of these men, thereby attempting to account for their individuality in outlooks while locating them within a 
larger, social and intellectual realm of interwar Canadian or Western-European thought and history. As the 
vocabulary and lenses used by these men to make sense of their surroundings in Tokyo were devised (usually in a 
Western setting and context) through either social, cultural, or 'academic' means, it becomes necessary to consider 
how and why the knowledge and assumptions they brought with them persisted. Moreover, the exteriority 
demonstrated by their recorded observations – as outlined and adopted as a central framework in Said's analysis – 
speaks not only to their views of Japan from 1929, but also to place and role as representatives of the nation of 
Canada there. Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), especially 20-4. 
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exchanges – exchanges within which the diplomat has, in the case of the Canadians in Japan, 
been understood primarily as the facilitator of policy. It asks how and why the political ends to 
these men's actions (Canadian policy in East Asia) were shaped and how each understood and 
performed his duty in Tokyo's concert halls and hotel lounges, and in the homes and offices of 
friends and colleagues. The perspectives and experiences of these individuals are thereby 
recovered from the silencing effects of the top-down analysis of the political or diplomatic 
histories to date.15 Indeed, as each had a hand in guiding his nation's political, economic, social, 
and cultural relationship with Japan, the individual views and experiences of the legation staff 
are as important to explanations and analyses of late-interwar international relations as the 
policies and actions of nation-states. 
 The bilateral relationship inaugurated with the exchange of ministers and reciprocal 
opening of offices at the respective capitals established channels by which the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs promoted trade, negotiated immigration restrictions, and 
advertised various selling points of Canadian life and society. But how did the men at Tokyo 
actually conduct these tasks? How were the lofty goals of the Prime Minister and Parliament 
interpreted and pursued? Moreover, how did Keenleyside, Marler, and Kirkwood negotiate their 
own perceptions of their role at Tokyo, as well as their perceptions of Canadian identity? To 
investigate these processes of reflection and negotiation, conflict and deliberation, I turn to not 
only the cables and despatches which streamed from the desk of the legation staff, but also to the 
candid reflection and musings in the personal papers of Canada's first diplomats in Japan. 
 
Literature Review 
The Canadian legation at Tokyo has received only limited attention from historians of Canadian 
foreign policy or Canadian-Japanese relations. Moreover, much of the work on this period and 
region remains limited to the political spheres of the ascendant Atlantic powers of Great Britain 
                                                 
15
 These histories, as we shall see, have often privileged a certain event before attempting to explain causes, the 
reasons for its placement as a watershed moment, or how (and if) the national, political realm was thereafter 
irrevocably affected. The present study rejects such teleological models – explanations of the thirties that pit 
Canadians against the interests of a Europe (or, less commonly, an East Asia) on a 'road to war,' for example – 
attempting instead to demonstrate in the experiences of the men of the legation aspects of an ascendant, interwar 
Canadian society that was measurably more uncertain of itself than has been previously shown. 
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and America.16 Recent developments in the fields of Pacific world and international histories 
have meanwhile made space for new studies of Canadian relations in East Asia by 
reconceptualizing the region as an inclusive, transnational 'arena.' By adopting this framework 
for a study of interwar Canadian diplomacy, the themes of political autonomy and international 
manoeuvring generally framed in previous studies with near exclusive reference to the Atlantic 
powers can become visible.  
The only monograph devoted to the history of the legation, John D. Meehan's 2004 The 
Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-1941, reflects several important 
and emerging trends in the discipline. By carefully organizing his political analysis around 
empire without silencing the historical voices of individuals, Meehan straddled a methodological 
divide that for decades separated the field of political history from its social and cultural 
counterparts. This allowed him to at once examine the legation’s effect on national, British, and, 
to a lesser extent, American policy in the increasingly Japanese-dominated East Asia of the 
1930s.17 His work thus provides the political and contextual base for the current study, while at 
the same time representing one model of the new international history – a model that, as David 
Meren has explained, offers "reappraisals of Canadian action in the traditional North Atlantic 
Triangle but also in explorations of the regions beyond it" while acknowledging the "significance 
                                                 
16
 While the venues, actors, moments, and politics that the established historiography emphasised did shift – focus 
moved from the words of Canadian delegates at the League of Nations, to the earlier, and less glamorously 
internationalist, exchanges with British or American policy-forming elites at various conferences organized within 
the frameworks of either Empire and, later, Commonwealth or the Anglo-American dominated 'North Atlantic 
Triangle. Beyond the subject of Canadian opinion and policy on the 'Manchurian Question' of 1931 and subsequent 
Second Sino-Japanese War, little analysis was conducted.  
17
 Meehan demonstrates how “collective security, pacifism, disarmament, and appeasement” became the dominant 
and guiding ideologies of the inter-war governments of both Bennett and King, placing Canada within a moderate 
middle-position between American isolationism and the larger, global-imperial concerns of Great Britain. Meehan, 
The Dominion and the Rising Sun, 4. Moreover, on the subject of purveyors of autonomism within the Dominion 
and its Department of External Affairs, Meehan finds their efforts checked by King’s unwillingness to challenge 
British politic hegemony outright: the new offices created abroad in 1927 and 1929 are notably “legations, not 
embassies,” run by “ministers plenipotentiary rather than ambassadors." Ibid., 7. Nevertheless, he agrees with 
Hilliker in asserting that “there was greater distancing from British officials in Tokyo than had been the case in 
Washington or Paris” – something he implies was the product of British preoccupation with Chinese nationalism as 
a “more apparent threat to regional security than Japanese imperialism” Ibid., 18; Hilliker, Canada's Department of 
External Affairs: Volume I vol. 1, 122; Meehan, The Dominion and the Rising Sun, 36. 
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of empire and its legacy in the Canadian experience" with a "more expansive geographical 
approach."18 
 The individual and Canadian society were, however, only peripheral concerns of 
Meehan's study. Like much of the scholarship on early Canadian diplomacy in East Asia, The 
Dominion and the Rising Sun highlights an early form of Dominion political autonomy and 
identity while only unevenly considering how the interpersonal exchanges between Canadian 
and foreign representatives propelled and shaped official, bilateral relations between the two 
nations.19 Resistant to bottom-up approaches, Meehan's analysis only partially penetrates beyond 
the national, political level. As recent observers in the fields of international history, political 
science, and sociology have noted, "diplomats are real people, who do a practical job, and the 
diplomatic corps which protects their collective identity and professional integrity, is the most 
tangible expression of international society that exists."20 To access this historical, international 
society, the individuals who comprised it must be adopted as both the starting point for, and 
indeed central subject of, that analysis. 
 For decades, trends in the research and writing of Canadian political history relegated the 
Tokyo legation to a place beyond the pale of the mainstream, national-political narrative. 
Meehan's work at once built upon their research while meanwhile challenging their shortcomings.  
To explain the shortcomings of the half-century of literature before Meehan, Ian McKay's 2000 
article, "The Liberal Order Framework," is useful for its highlighting the number of perceptibly 
hegemonic trends of Canadian historiography, demonstrating how historiographical modes are 
themselves part and parcel of forces that have long shaped the social and political environment 
of Canada. Describing the nation of Canada, its socio-political environs, as well as its national 
history, McKay identifies an "arrestingly contradictory, complicated, and yet coherent process of 
liberal rule."21 This liberal order, he argues, stretches back to the Rebellions of 1837 and has led 
                                                 
18
 David Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," in The Canadian Historical Review Vol. 96, No. 
4 (December 2015), 562. 
19
 Indeed, others in the field of Canadian international history criticised Meehan for his apparent hesitancy to push 
his study further beyond the limits of traditional diplomatic history. See, for instance, John Price, review of The 
Dominion and the Rising Sun, by Meehan, The International History Review Vol. 28, No. 3 (Sept., 2006), 626. 
20
 James Mayall, introduction to The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of International Society, eds. Paul Sharp 
and Geoffrey Wiseman (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5.  
21
 Ian McKay, "The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian History," in The 
Canadian Historical Review 81:4 (2000), 623; As a broad and provocative sketch of the national historical 'project,' 
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Canadian historians to explain, justify, and ennoble their nation-state via its history.22 These were 
and are the writers of the aforementioned historiographies of Canadian interwar foreign policy 
and East Asian relations. The voices marginalized in the selective historical record of these 
dominant narratives remained silenced until the interventions of academics in the fields of social 
and cultural history of the sixties and seventies. Thereafter, historians adopting increasingly 
inclusivist and transnational approaches attempted to recover these voices, paving the way for a 
"new Canadian political history," one that remains in a state of constant redefinition in relation to 
its usage of balanced and varied critical perspectives.23 
 As the force behind this liberal order's entrenchment in both the dominant 
historiographies and the ostensibly collective, national consciousness, the works of academics in 
the fields of political and diplomatic history in the mid- to late-twentieth century are striking for 
their avoidance of Marler's diplomatic mission to Tokyo. The founding of the Canadian legation 
to Japan in 1929 was an event that, in even the most tactless of readings, represented an 
unprecedented break from the political and ideological Atlanticism of the day.24 Matching neither 
the interests of the southward gazing continentalists and autonomists, nor those of nostalgic 
imperialists, the legation experiment to East Asia could not serve the liberal nationalist 
historiography of the twentieth century mainstream.25 The experiences of the men at Tokyo from 
1929 thus resisted placement in nation-building narratives as result of conflicting periodization, 
as well as the inconsistently articulated nature of their diplomatic mission.26 While McKay's 
                                                                                                                                                             
complete with his own biting criticisms and politically charged recommendations and demands, the initial 2000 
article continues to incite much debate. For a sampling of the various responses and positions formulated in the 
wake of McKay's first and later successive presentations of this historiographical intervention, see: McKay, "Canada 
as a Long Liberal Revolution: On Writing the History of Actually Existing in Canadian Liberalism, 1840s-1940s," 
in Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution, ed. by Jean-Francois Constant and Michel 
Ducharme, 347-452 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 
22
 McKay, "The Liberal Order Framework," 632-3, 642. 
23
 Ibid., 618, 620. 
24
 Historians have in fact struggled to recover this history for the liberal-national project. Attempts to align 
aberrations from of the status quo in foreign policy with the Eurocentric frameworks of the North Atlantic Triangle 
or Ottawa-Washington paradigms have appeared only sporadically since that decade. 
25
 Distinction between these otherwise similarly liberal-nationalist views is made in David Meren's succinct 
description of their respective central narratives of "colony-to-nation" and "empire-to-commonwealth" – at once 
neither incompatible with one another, nor groundbreaking for an improved inclusivity of voice or experience. 
Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 540-1, 544. 
26
 The diminished effectiveness of Marler and his staff in dealing with the radicalizing face of Japanese 
militarization and expansionism in mid-decade, as we shall see, further reduced their potential usefulness to the 
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intervention helps to explain this liberal order's silence regarding Marler and his staff at Tokyo, 
its wider implications provide important tools with which to now reassess and reinsert the 
Canadian diplomatic mission to Tokyo into the diverse and interconnected histories of late-
interwar international, social, and cultural histories. 
 Together with studies aimed to demonstrate the processes and circumstances of nation 
building in Canada, early histories of Canadian foreign policy contributed to the birth of two 
dominant frameworks of diplomatic and international political history that persist today. The first 
is the so-called 'North Atlantic Triangle.27 The second, which sometimes includes the first as its 
central form of demonstrative evidence, is the colony-to-nation narrative framework.28 
Depending on one's politics, these two representations affirmed and perpetuated the state-
centered, progressivist narratives of either Canada's place within a global British Empire, or its 
alignment with an Anglophone fellowship of nation-states.29 The first wave of studies of Canada 
in East Asia were a part of what David Meren, building upon the historiographical observations 
of McKay, has identified as the "liberal-nationalist school" of Canadian historical thought.30 
Meren notes that despite its fractiousness over particulars, an important and powerful 
mainstream of Canadian academics put forth concerted efforts to respond to empire, thereby 
                                                                                                                                                             
statist, geo-political narratives of a world history (as represented primarily by European and Western powers) aimed 
to explain the preparations or road to war for war. Neither did its staff take a completely autonomist, nationalist 
position in Tokyo. Marler's tendency to at once espouse empire and autonomy hindered his ability to present his 
mission as much as either of these ideals. 
27
 For the earliest conceptualization of this 'North Atlantic Triangle,' see John Bartlet Brebner, "Canada, and the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," in Political Science Quarterly vol. 50, no. 1 (1935): 45-
58. 
28
 The colony-to-nation parable was developed by Arthur Reginald Lower in his Colony to Nation: A History of 
Canada (Toronto: Longmanss, Green, 1946). 
29
 In the field of early Canadian-Japanese relations, works central to the concurrent efforts to explain the nation of 
Canada – its history, as well as its future place in the world – include: Arthur Lower, Canada and the Far East, 1940 
(New York: International Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations: 1940); J. S. Woodsworth, Canada and the 
Orient: A Study in International Relations (Toronto: MacMillan Company of Canada: 1941); for a bibliographic 
sketch of Canadian diplomatic history at the mid-century, see: George Parkin de Twenebroker Glazebrook, 
"Canadian Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century," in The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March, 
1949): 44-55. 
30
 Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 541. 
 12 
 
producing a shared interest in the "asymmetrical power relationships" of Canada and either its 
southern neighbour or imperial motherland.31 
 Meren's recent appraisal of the history of Canadian foreign relations and diplomacy plots 
shifts in the fields of both 'diplomatic,' as well as the more broadly inclusivist 'international' 
history in Canada since the last decades of the nineteenth century. While the scope and range of 
analysis within these two approaches are distinct – diplomatic history being limited to 
"intergovernmental relations," international approaches making way for "phenomena beyond the 
governmental or political spheres" – he finds the latter to be applicable across all prior moments 
and periods traditionally the subjects of diplomatic history. In fact, mindful of McKay's 
conclusions and recommendations,32 Meren argues for an adoption of the international approach 
in place of strictly diplomatic analyses.33 Tracing Canadian nationalist historiography from the 
capitulation of "the imperialist version," with its focus on "participation in the British Empire" in 
the 1910s, to an "imperial rivalry" model, he thus locates and connects the trends and schools of 
(often nationalist) thought articulated and demonstrated by both himself, and the recent works of 
others, across a century's worth of literature.34 This he uses to illuminate debates amongst 
imperialist and continentalist academics who, wielding their respective forms of nationalism 
while drawing on research and observations, attempted to demonstrate the historically justified 
                                                 
31
 More specifically, he explains how the tensions between "rival 'imperialist' and 'autonomist' narratives" within the 
liberal-nationalist school persisted from the late-1930s, as it did in Canadian "political and cultural life." In this way, 
attention was directed toward either America or England in order to explain Canada. Ibid., 541, 539-40. 
32
 While Meren is primarily interested in practises in the fields of diplomatic or international history, he expressed 
intentions to contribute to a larger examination of "current trends in order to emphasize the potential of Canadian 
international history as a means to explore and interrogate Canada as a project of rule." Meren, "The Tragedies of 
Canadian International History," 538. He goes on to clarify that 'project of rule' by quoting McKay's 2009 
articulation of the framework introduced in his 2000 CHR article: Canada as a project of rule, as examined with 
Meren's formulation of good international history addresses McKay's claims that it was a state that "came into being 
as an extended colonial experiment in British liberal forms of rule in northern North America." McKay, "Canada As 
a Long Liberal Revolution," 349, quoted in Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 538. 
33
 Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 527.  
34
 On the earliest, imperialist interests of (diplomatic) history in Canada, see McKay, "Canada as a Long Liberal 
Revolution;" on the imperial nationalism typical of Canadian historiography pre-WWI, see Carl Berger, The Writing 
of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writings since 1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1985); on the subsequent rise of autonomism (in its various forms), see Ibid., as well as Phillip Buckner, 
"How Canadian Historians Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Americans!," Acadiensis Vol. 25, No. 2 
(Spring 1996); and on the concurrent and influential trends of professionalization and specialization within the field 
of history in English Canada more broadly, see Donald A. Wright, The Professionalization of History in English 
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
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place and purpose of Canada in the post-Paris Peace global and international community.35 
Meren thus provides the outline upon which the relevant works on Canadian diplomatic, 
governmental engagement with Japan have been presented, helping, along with McKay, to 
explain how and why historians wrote (or, just as importantly, did not write) about the Tokyo 
legation.36 Meanwhile, the "shift of focus from government to civil society" Meren advocates 
offers important alternatives to the top-down approaches of more traditional institutional 
histories in this field by "yielding more complex studies of the social and cultural phenomena – 
immediate and latent – that inform the actions of foreign policy elites," highlighting "the 
importance of individuals and elements on the margins of, or excluded from, formal power 
structures and their impact on international affairs."37 As entry points to the history of the 
                                                 
35
 Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 538-9. It is within the latter group that he notes a more 
staunchly autonomist stream appeared in both the literature and the socio-political reality; this was perhaps best 
demonstrated by the academic and later diplomatic career of Oscar D. Skelton, Under-Secretary of State for External 
Affairs throughout this period, as well as Hugh L. Keenleyside, First secretary to the Tokyo legation. He turns to 
Skelton's academic contributions to demonstrate the autonomists' position. The popularity of Skelton's work, 
General Economic History of the Dominion: 1867-1912 (Toronto: Publisher's Association of Canada, 1913), 
amongst international and often socialist audiences has been elaborated by Hillmer in: Hillmer, O.D. Skelton, 40-1. 
See also Hillmer's discussion of Skelton's earlier thesis, revised and published in 1911 as Socialism: A Critical 
Analysis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911) in: Hillmer, Ibid. 
36
 Indeed, as Meren explains the lasting liberal-nationalist influence on Canadian scholarship: "The colony-to-nation 
theme meant that 'empire' figured in the liberal-nationalist telling as a foil against which Canada's evolution and 
international activity could be measured. [For continentalist-autonomists,] Empire became something Canada had 
allegedly outgrown, even overcome. However, this interpretation, with its nation-building logic and rejection of 
imperial dynamics, encouraged the obscuring, if not deliberate forgetting, of Canada's participatory role in empire, 
the active and enthusiastic contribution of Canadians to the imperial enterprise, and the fact that Canada was itself a 
project of empire, one with dramatic consequences for those finding themselves on its margins or excluded. [...] The 
liberal-nationalist interpretation thus encouraged a reduction in the number of subjects worthy of study, notably 
those that would have sown doubts about its triumphalism" – until, that is, the opening of the twenty-first century 
witnessed the 'return' of empire with what Meren calls the "neo-imperial-nationalist" current. Meren, "The 
Tragedies of Canadian International History," 543, 557 (emphasis in the original). 
37
 These perspectives, he argues, shifts attention from "[f]ormal diplomacy, the state, and the nation to explore 
questions of race, culture, class, gender, and religion, recognizing that these shape the international activities of 
governments and populations." Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 562. This is not to 
completely discredit and discard the importance of the 'nation' in all of this. Indeed, even as a social, political, or 
legal construct, the state's existence can hardly be disputed – as diplomats at Tokyo, Marler, Keenleyside, and 
Kirkwood's lives and jobs were made possible only by the power, privilege, and authority their diplomatic status 
(vested in them by their head of state) granted them. Reciprocal acceptance and respect for these vested credentials 
remains a foundational tenet upon which diplomacy is conducted today. Meren gestures to the vestigial importance 
of the 'nation' in this new diplomatic history when he explains: "Attention to the transnational facilitates the 
interrogating of nationalist accounts, the transcending of what is ultimately an arbitrary domestic/foreign divide, a 
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Canadian legation to Tokyo, as well as that of early diplomatic relations between the two states, 
the lives and experiences of the three ranking officials posted there from 1929 will serve to 
decenter analysis, as Meren advocates, to foster a nuanced and broadly illuminating, inclusive 
study of the seemingly peripheral, interpersonal and social aspects of international exchange.  
In The Dominion and the Rising Sun, Meehan drew primarily upon four major works in 
Canadian foreign policy noteworthy for their considerations of East Asia.38 Taken together, these 
works are useful in sketching out the changing and politicized landscape of the more traditional 
scholarship on Canadian foreign policy in the Pacific, and elsewhere. An early example is C.P. 
Stacey’s two-volume work, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External 
Policies. Like his liberal-nationalist colleagues, Stacey concentrates these volumes on 
demonstrating and explaining Canadian diplomatic manoeuvrings in the first half of the century 
as processes the state's evolution from a colonial – and thus powerless and underperforming – 
position through its becoming a Dominion of the Commonwealth and Canadians' realization of 
their state's full potential as a soft-power, peacemaking, autonomous political entity. While 
eschewing opportunities to demonstrate the colony-to-nation trajectory of Canadian policy in 
East Asia, Stacy situates the history Canadian involvement in Atlantic- and European 
developments within precisely that narrative.39 Indeed the growth and achievement of political 
autonomy alongside or within empire persisted as the dominant framework of Canadian national 
history until at least the last decade of the century.40 John Thompson and Allen Seager's 1985 
book, Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord, further demonstrates this trend. The authors turn 
                                                                                                                                                             
shift of focus from government to civil society, and a recognition that although the 'national' and the 'state' need to 
be taken into consideration, what is more rightly called international history is far more complex." Meren, Ibid. 
38
 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies, Volume 2: 1921-1948, The 
Mackenzie King Era (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981); Klaus H. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the 
Pacific: The Development of Economic and Political Relations Between Canada and Japan (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1983); H. Thompson and A. Seager, Canada 1929-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1985); Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs: Volume I. 
39
 In a work that as a second volume spans more that 400-pages, the opening of the legation is given a paragraph; 
pre-war economic relations between the two states cover less than three; and Marler's seven-year career as Canada's 
first Minister to Japan is mentioned twice. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 2, 90-1, 191-3, 125-6. 
40
 As Meren has noted, the obsession with empire never really dissipated amongst the liberal-nationalists. While the 
form and purpose of 'empire' in these cases has no doubt shifted – Meren explains how empire as a way of defining a 
national, Canada policy, position, or identity become for some linked with an American empire after September 11 – 
the reality is that empire remains a lighthouse with which Canadian historians orient their positions on and 
explanations of past and present (and, when writing less formally, future) national policy or discourse. Meren, "The 
Tragedies of Canadian International History," 558-60. 
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to the 1921 Imperial Conference – an international meeting of imperial representatives at which 
Canadian Prime Minister Arthur Meighen led an effort to dismantle the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
– to explain the earliest examples of Canadian autonomy and agency in foreign relations and the 
fact that, for the first time, "a dominion could play a role in shaping an imperial decision.”41 They 
thus echo previous representations of Canada as an emergent nation within a framework of 
power itself grounded in the contexts of the North Atlantic Triangle.42 
 Others, however, have begun to challenge the liberal-nationalist perspective. One of the 
earliest examples is Klaus Pringsheim’s 1983 monograph, Neighbors Across the Pacific.43 Born 
in Germany, Pringsheim fled in April 1939 and, avoiding military service and renouncing his 
German citizenship, sought asylum in Japan where he was educated and waited out the war as a 
resident and later prisoner. During the occupation of Japan, he moved to America for graduate 
studies, beginning a career as a professor and then relocating to Canada. Later, Pringsheim 
became a facilitator and advisor of Japanese-Canadian business in Ontario.44 Neighbors Across 
the Pacific anticipates later interest in the circumstances of relations between the two states, in 
particular the study of British Columbian opposition to Asian immigration in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Many of the issues Pringsheim's work included are those on which scholars 
seeking to challenge or circumvent the liberal-national mainstream have since focused. Though 
initially drafted in fulfilment of a contract with the Department of External Affairs, editors there 
refused Pringsheim's manuscript after reading his accounts of the early century living conditions 
of Japanese immigrants in British Columbia.45 Moreover, his insistence that excerpts from 
                                                 
41
 Thompson and Seager, Canada 1929-1939, 39. 
42
 The authors' considerations for Canadian-Japanese interactions and Canadian foreign policy in the region are 
limited to Ottawa's reactions to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the League of Nation’s Lytton commission, and 
the words of Canadian delegates to The Hague on the issue. Thomspon and Seagar, Decades of Discord, 307. 
43
 Not bound to periods of formal diplomatic connection, Pringsheim instead traces flows of trade and peoples 
crossing the Pacific from as early as 1870, allowing for a more inclusive, decentralized account the 100-years 
leading up to his present. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, 5. 
44
 Klaus H. Pringsheim and Victor Boesen, Man of the World: Memoirs of Europe, Asia & North America (1930s to 
1980s) (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1995), 29-31, 49, 100-1. 
45
 This arrangement included a sizable advance and deadline framework similar to that from which Kirkwood's 
drafts were completed (though left unpublished) nearly twenty years prior. On the particulars of the initial 
arrangements for Pringsheim's monograph, see his memoirs: Ibid., 219. The work highlights Anti-Japanese 
sentiment and white nativism British Columbia while explaining the internment of residents of Japanese descent in 
early 1942. Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific, 8, 37. 
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Mackenzie King's diary revealing the former Prime Minister's racialized views of the hierarchies 
of the world's populations be quoted in full led External to terminate his contract.46 
 Although Pringsheim's own life set him apart from any predisposition to write nationalist 
Canadian history, he also refused to acknowledge any actively autonomist intentions on behalf of 
those at the legation in Tokyo.47 Moreover, Canada’s profitable relationships with East Asia and 
Japan, he asserted, were realized only under the direction of the next generation of External 
employees – the celebrated group of Canadian diplomatic stars: Norman Robertson, Arthur 
Menzies, and Lester B. Pearson.48 Indeed the allure of empire, the North Atlantic Triangle, and 
Canada's so-called golden age of balanced and noble foreign policy continued to occupy 
Canadian political historians writing about policy and international relations, including John 
Hilliker who, in 1990, published the first institutional history of the Department of External 
Affairs. Though he adopted a much broader scope of analysis to examine all arms of the 
department, his interwar analysis remained largely shaped by developments in Europe. Canada's 
Department of External Affairs can be aligned with Meren's observations of the neo-imperial-
nationalist current – one that has reasserted the various liberal-nationalist streams that came 
                                                 
46
 Hearing about the bombing of Hiroshima, Pringsheim explains King's reaction by including the following quote in 
its entirety: "Naturally this word created mixed feelings in my mind and heart. We were now within sight of the end 
of the war with Japan. We now see what might have come to the British people had German scientists won the race. 
It is fortunate that the use of the bomb should have been upon the Japanese people rather than upon the white races 
of Europe." Library and Archives Canada, King Papers, quoted by Pringsheim in Neighbors Across the Pacific, 91; 
Pringsheim then notes that in J.W. Pickersgill's official history of the Prime Minister during this period, The 
Mackenzie King Record, the last sentence is absent. J.W Pickersgill and D.R. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record: 
Volume 2: 1944-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 451. Moreover, Pringsheim uses this 
discrepancy – as well his determination to set the record straight, so to speak – as an explanation as for why his 
contract from the Department of External Affairs to write the institution's history was abrogated. Pringsheim and 
Boesen, Man of the World, 221. 
47
 Pringsheim’s assessment of Marler and his staff is informed mainly by Canada’s economic performance. As he 
demonstrates, economic growth enjoyed through the twenties (perhaps unsurprisingly) peaked in 1929, dropped 
substantially in 1933-4, and was later followed by Bennett’s “trade war” with Japan which King quickly abrogated 
after regaining the premiership in 1935.Pringsheim, Neighbors Across the Pacific 42, 44-5. Concluding his 
assessment of Canada and Japan's pre-war diplomacy, Pringsheim dismisses the legation as a failed endeavour: “the 
hopeful beginnings of Keenleyside, Marler, and Tokugawa [Japan’s representative to Ottawa before the war]” had to 
“begin all over again” in the fifties, when circumstances provided healthy relations between the two states “a far 
better chance to succeed.” Pringsheim, Ibid., 106. 
48
 Here, however briefly, Pringsheim's reading of Canadian diplomacy becomes aligned with that of his adopted 
nation's established mainstream, demonstrating the ability of the post-war, golden age narrative to silence the 
unprecedented action and circumstances of Tokyo in 1929. 
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before it, meanwhile demonstrating a "renewed interest in Canada's place in the 'British World" 
as well as in its golden age peacekeeping achievements.49  
 Through the 1990s, the achievements of the social and cultural historians were slowly 
making an impact on political history, dealing direct challenges to the North Atlantic Triangle-
based readings of Canadian foreign policy which still favoured the imperial framework of 
Commonwealth and intra-imperial relations when explaining Canada's role and effectiveness in 
Japan after 1929.50 On the subjects of diplomacy and international (or transnational) exchanges, 
however, top-down nation-building narratives remained the norm.51 Nevertheless, the lives and 
experiences of the men sending the cables and despatches so much of the prior research was built 
upon began for the first time to take a place in the historiography. While not representative of a 
complete break from the hitherto established nationalist mainstream, the work of Tou Chu Dou 
Lynhiavu in the 1990s in some ways anticipated the discipline's changing appreciation for the 
role of the individual in intergovernmental and intersocietal exchanges. It is for his use of 
personal papers to supplement records of External, House debates, and the Prime Ministers' 
                                                 
49
 Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 557-8. To demonstrate the return of interest in 
Canada-via-a British World, Meren points to a number of studies of turn of the century and early twentieth century 
Canadian constitutional and domestic, political history to which I would propose that large sections of Volume 1 of 
Hilliker's Canada's Department of External Affairs match. For the triumphs of this period see the roles of Lester 
Pearson and Under-Secretary after 1941 Norman Robertson, see especially pages 242-3 and 282. 
50
 Tou Chu Dou Lynhiavu, “The Establishment of Canada’s Tokyo Legation in 1928: Canada’s Relations with Japan, 
1894-1933” (MA thesis, University of Ottawa, 1991); Lynhiavu, “Canada’s Window on Asia: The Establishment of 
the Tokyo Legation in 1928-1931,” in Journal of Canadian Studies vol. 31, no. 4 (winter 1996/1997). Lynhiavu's 
study, while grounded in the familiar framework Anglo-Canadian relations as related to the inauguration of the 
Dominion’s diplomatic ties with Tokyo, was unique for its demonstration of the history of bi-lateral treaty signing 
capabilities of the Dominion. This he uses to show how the role of federal institutions evolved in the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century – analysis resembling that of Hilliker, if only more narrowly focused (temporally as well 
as geographically) and thorough. 
51
 To Lynhiavu, the twenties "witnessed a struggle for genuine recognition of Canadian nationhood." Lynhiavu, 
“Canada’s Tokyo Legation” (MA thesis), 27. His final assessment of the legation is inextricably linked to this 
statement as he finds that "despite divided counsel on the Manchurian Crisis, the Legation performed its intelligence 
role as well as could have been expected." Lynhiavu, “Canada’s Window on Asia, 115. For an even more 
pronounced 'return' to the imperially, nationally framed perspective, see: Greg C. Kennedy, "Imperial Crossroad: 
The Influence of the Far East on Anglo-American Relations, 1933-1939," (PhD diss., University of Alberta, 1998); 
Johnson, “Canada and the Far East During the 1930s,” in Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century, edited by 
Schultz, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); as well as equivalent streams amongst Japanese scholars 
with personal professional connections to Canadian institutions and academics communities. For example: Toshihiro 
Tanaka, “W.L.M. King, O.D. Skelton, and Their Diplomacy,” Reitaku Review no. 10 (2004): 15-37. 
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office that Lynhiavu's work offered such valuable contributions.52 Thereafter, several more 
studies on related historical episodes – each framed and plottable amongst the streams of either 
the neo-imperial-nationalist or the budding, diplomatic history-variant of study established by the 
social and cultural historians of a previous generation53 – began to crystallise across a handful of 
articles and chapters in the journals and volumes of Canadian history.54  
 After roughly 2005, the individual began to re-emerge alongside and as a part of the 
otherwise political or institutionally framed international Canadian histories. Meehan himself 
remained active in this endeavour, contributing chapters focused alternatively on the policies and 
forces driving the expansion of External Affairs, or the people who shaped those developments. 
Volumes such as Architects and Innovators: Building the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 1909-2009 returned to the well-known, as well as lesser-known men and 
women to which that institution's successes, failures, and expansions are attributed.55 Its editors 
and contributors engaged in a re-examination of the individual in history as not only 
                                                 
52
 Lynhiavu nevertheless halts his investigation of the interpersonal relations and experience after demonstrating his 
somewhat questionable argument that Ottawa simply expected too much from understaffed legation. This point is 
hardly convincing given that all three of the offices' highest ranking officials wrote of Ottawa's apparent disinterest 
in their work at the Japanese capital. Furthermore, Lynhiavu overlooks Marler’s personal desires, most obviously 
(and contemptuously) exemplified by the minister's constant requests for expanded authority over the entire region 
of East Asia. 
53
 Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," 559-561. 
54
 Important and representative works from this stream with relation to the states, societies, and period in question 
here include: Peter Oblas, "Canada's Far West Policy: China and Japan 1929-1932," in The Journal of American and 
Canadian Studies No. 18 (2000), accessed January 2015, http://dept.sophia.ac.jp/is/amecana/Journal/18-2.htm; in 
the field of architectural history, Marie-Josee Therrien, "Canadian Chanceries in Tokyo," in Contradictory Impulses: 
Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century, eds. Greg Dinghy and Patricia Roy (Vancouver: UBCPress, 2008): 
232-243; and J.H. Taylor, "A New Base for Promoting Canada's Interests in Japan in Japan," in "Special Trust and 
Confidence": Envoy Essays in Canadian Diplomacy, ed. David Reece (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996): 
255-268; in women's and gender history see: Vivien Hughes, "Women, Gender, and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1909-
2009," in British Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 23, No. 2 (2010): 159-178; Margaret K. Weiers, Envoys 
Extraordinary: Women of the Foreign Service (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1995), especially Introduction, Chapters 1-
2; on the individuals and non-state actors who experienced Japan during this period, see A. Hamish Ion, The Cross 
in the Dark Valley: The Canadian Protestant Missionary Movement in the Japanese Empire, 1931-1945 (Waterloo: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999); Yuko Ohara, "J.W. Dafoe and Japanese-Canadian Relations during the 
1920s," trans. Peter Currie, in Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century: 60-74; Eber H. Rice, "Sir Herbert 
Marler and the Canadian Legation in Tokyo," in Ibid.: 75-84. 
55
 John D. Meehan, “Herbert Marler: The Tokyo Legation and Canada’s Pacific Debut, 1929-1936,” in Architects 
and Innovators: Building the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009, eds. Greg Dinghy 
and Kim Nossal (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 109-125. 
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representatives of the various "phases" of the institution itself, but also as windows into 
Canadian and international society more broadly – political, cultural, or otherwise.56 
 For their part, social anthropologists have also ventured into the fields of international 
history, similarly taking the diplomat as subject in order to understand precisely how political 
international relations are and have been conducted on the interpersonal level. Iver B. Neumann 
provides one framework with which to identify and understand the agency of the individual in 
diplomacy, as well as the processes of identification with which they define, protect, and employ 
it. Within the Western diplomatic discourse, he argues, the realm of the diplomat and diplomacy 
is that of "mediation between political entities with diverse cultures."57 At the most fundamental 
levels of these processes are the lives and work of diplomats; it is as result of their actions and 
negotiations in the various national capitals that international policies are formed. For much of 
the twentieth century, diplomats were in control of a division between public and private aspects 
of their individual lives, but also aware of their role and responsibilities as negotiators in a 
transnational exchange of knowledge and power.58 Thus, Neumann argues, the important aspects 
of the real processes of diplomacy are found only when one considers the "specific instances 
when diplomats present what they themselves think are the practices that form the key or even 
core of diplomacy."59 It is through their own management of self, constantly reflected upon and 
performed as they live and work as the most basic unit in a global system of communications and 
politics, that the real processes of diplomacy are revealed. As subjects of historical analysis then, 
the diplomat is as valuable a source of knowledge about past political, social, and economic 
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 In its editors' words, the volume examines "the national institution by exploring the experiences of particular 
individuals who contributed to the transformation of Canada's foreign ministry over the last century" – their efforts 
to do so they describe as "illustrative rather than comprehensive." Greg Dinghy and Kim Richard Nossal, 
introduction to Architects and Innovators, 2. 
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 Iver B Neuman, "To Be a Diplomat," in International Studies Perspectives vol. 6 (2005), 72. 
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 Working on subjects from within his own lifetime, Neumann operationalizes the diplomats' perceived role by 
generalizing that as negotiators, diplomats "do not experience negotiation as taking place on behalf of themselves. 
They see their role as being that of incorporating their Minister, their Ministry, their government, their state" – 
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hegemonic and that, in fact, considerations of class and ethnicity alluded to by Neuman were more easily and deeply 
folded into their self-perceived roles both within and without the aforementioned diplomatic (as well as 
interpersonal and self-reflexive) practice of negotiation. Neuman, "To Be a Diplomat," 85. 
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histories as they are about the real processes of diplomacy past and present. Moreover, the 
individual offers a way to circumvent the hegemonic, top-down perspectives which, as we have 
seen, have limited the scope and reach of international history in Canada.  
 Since the early 2000s, others have adopted transnational frameworks in writing global or 
Pacific-world histories, using them to critically assess the intricate networks of exchange 
preceding and persisting alongside official, governmental relations.60 These methods represent a 
shifting view of the Pacific and Pacific Canada that historian Henry Yu has described as "a 
perspective on Canada's past, present, and future that highlights the ways in which the nation has 
been and increasingly will be shaped by its engagement with the Pacific rather than the Atlantic 
world."61 For these scholars, the state represents the point of departure – the lives and 
experiences of those facilitators of exchange provide the sources and narratives with which the 
historian might illuminate the alternatively unusual, individualisms of experience, or the 
universal and collective aspects of various societies and movements. In this way, the weight and 
influence of the nation as the central, organizing category of analysis is checked, allowing the 
interpersonal and more fluid and mobile forces of social and cultural origin to rotate to the front 
of this presented history.62 John Price's study of Canadian East and South Asian foreign and 
domestic policy, Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific, is to date the best 
application of these aspects of new international, diplomatic history to the subject of Canadian 
policy in the Pacific.63 By adopting inclusive frameworks of periodization and analysis and 
applying them to a source base of multiple provenances, Price seeks not to justify the present 
conditions of his subject, but rather to critically and diametrically expose aspects of its history 
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hitherto marginalized and erased, thereby circumventing the influences of mainstream 
historiographies.  
 Despite all of their achievements, Canadian scholars – especially those writing in the 
decades since Stacey – have yet to exhaustively analyse Keenleyside, Marler, Kirkwood's 
experiences in Tokyo. Therefore, rather than assessing the legation as a unitary actor in a field of 
multilateral exchanges between nations, an appreciation for the role and experience of the 
individual allows us to assess precisely how and why the men of the Canadian legation put 
dominion autonomy in foreign affairs after 1929 to work to such an unprecedented degree. By 
eschewing various forms of top-down analysis, we can understand the Tokyo legation as at once 
an effort in the cultivation of business, of the nation-state, and of the self, highlighting the 
individual autonomy, agency, and privilege employed by these three diplomats, as well as their 
relevant and respective processes of identification. By beginning with their personal reflections, 
the present study seeks to uncover how the legation operated and how and why its staff chose to 
navigate and negotiate their own positions within the precarious space carved out for them.64 
Finally, it engages ongoing efforts in the field of Canadian history by questioning the persistent 
liberal-nationalist narrative derived from the very period in which these men lived and worked, 
accepting that they themselves at times contributed to or caught sight of the so-called liberal 
order that recent historians have argued so shaped the Canadian polity and its dominant, 
mainstream society. For these reasons, this thesis stands to benefit from and build upon the 
accomplishments and experiments of the existing scholarship, thereby contributing to a 
broadening of the field and to an increased inclusiveness in the range and scope of future projects 
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Canadian-Japanese Diplomatic Relations in Context 
Although the subject of Japanese-Canadian relations was discussed numerous times in the House 
of Commons before the turn of the century, it was not until Laurier struck down British 
Columbia's anti-Asian legislation in 1903 that the creation of more official and amicable 
transpacific relations became of interest to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. As Laurier 
explained, Canada and Japan were "neighbouring nations." As such, immigration and trade were 
issues that needed to be ironed out between them so as to that ensure that profits and friendships 
would persist for the duration of Canada's twentieth century.65  
 With economics and immigration at the forefront of the party's concerns, Laurier sent the 
first Canadian representative of any official capacity to Japan in 1903. Sydney Fisher, the 
Minister of Agriculture, visited Osaka, attending the National Industrial Exhibit there to promote 
trade and technology while overseeing the Canadian exhibit.66 The Canadian showcase handed 
out wheat and bread to attendees and local restaurants. The exhibit was so popular, in fact, that 
the emperor of Japan himself paid a visit to the Canadian pavilion.67 The trip, which Fisher had 
himself proposed in the House as a method to increase Canadian markets for flour as early as 
1897, was not limited in its scope to matters of economics, however.68 Immigration regulations 
remained a goal of the mission, and Fisher met with members of the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
for informal discussions on the subject. He also took the opportunity to attend the many social 
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events organized by the established diplomatic community, unofficially introducing the young 
Dominion to the numerous and mainly European faces of East Asian diplomatic society.69 
 No official, bilateral agreements came from Fisher's visit to Japan however. Instead, the 
Canadian government joined into the Anglo-Japanese agreement, thereby ensuring themselves 
the trade and immigration conditions British and Japanese negotiators had bilaterally agreed to in 
1894.70 Canada had thus yet to negotiate or establish any agreements with Japan and was instead 
subject to the conditions offered to Japan by Britain in that original treaty. Importantly, this 
included fair and equal treatment of Japanese imperial subjects within the lands of the British 
Empire.71 Japanese immigration persisted through the first years of the century, eventually 
coming to a head in 1907 when nativist white populations, protesting their government's 
unwillingness to bar South- and East Asian populations from immigrating to BC, rioted in the 
streets of Vancouver.72 White British Columbians thus provided the biggest challenge to the 
Liberal party's effort to promote 'friendship' between the two nations and the earliest diplomatic 
exchanges between Canadian and Japanese governments took place only in response to 
racialized, anti-Asian violence in western Canada. Ottawa had repeatedly blocked provincial 
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attempts to institute exclusionary, anti-Japanese immigration policy, but grassroots support for 
exclusion persisted.73 
 The violence of 1907 provoked strong reaction across the nation. In Ottawa, Laurier 
redoubled his efforts to respond to the calls of British Columbians for exclusion of non-whites. 
The Dominion was, however, bound by the stipulations of equal treatment and open immigration 
by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Heeding the call of white rioters but refusing to adopt such a 
blatantly racist measure as complete exclusion, the Liberals set out a plan of action that singled 
out certain preferred groups while severely limiting or barring others. Head taxes on Chinese 
migrants were increased; South Asians, many of them legal British subjects from India, were 
turned away at various moments of heightened nativist fervour. Meanwhile, a "Gentleman's 
Agreement" was negotiated by Labour Minister Rodolphe Lemieux, the first official Canadian 
representative sent to the East Asian imperial capital, ensuring that the Japanese government 
would not send more than 150 of its citizens into Canada per year.74 
 The anti-Asian fervour from which the riots emerged persisted long enough to shape 
Canadian policy in East Asia until at least 1941, highlighting the proximity of the local, domestic 
events in BC and the formation of Canadian foreign policy in the Pacific as well as even the 
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actions and views of the individuals abroad conducting those foreign relations. Reflecting on 
Anglo-Saxonism in the foreign relations and diplomacy of the decades that preceded the Second 
World War, American journalist and policy advisor Frederick Moore explained his troubles with 
interpersonal East-West relations: "I had never liked my Occidental people's attitude in the East," 
he wrote from America in 1942, after more than a decade in East Asia. A contemporary of 
Keenleyside, Kirkwood, and Marler in Tokyo after 1929, Moore explained that in Japan, as on 
the East Asian mainland more broadly, 
There were men – many I knew personally – who were models of 
exemplary conduct. There were the nobler missionary, the honest teacher, 
the self-sacrificing doctor, the student of what was fine in Asia, the 
states-man diplomat; since the days of Saint Francis Xavier the West had 
sent of its best to Asia. But such men had not given the tone that 
prevailed among the white men. There was the predatory class, the 
swaggerer, the whiskey addict, and even the opium runner. And these 
were not only Europeans; I knew Americans in every class, including the 
last.75 
The personal philosophies – political or social, and however variously racialized – of a number 
of representatives of Western nations to East Asia were so often troubling for Moore that, even 
while his nation waged war against the Empire of Japan, he aimed his criticisms at the racial 
chauvinism and destructive self-interestedness his government and its Western allies had 
perpetuated there for decades.76 To Moore, the men posted to Tokyo were more than their titles 
and ranks – they were representatives of a global, ascendant, and characteristically white 
society.77  
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 In 1929, with the Chinese polity appearing increasingly unstable by western, democratic 
standards, the unified, rapidly industrializing and militarily-capable Empire of Japan surpassed 
its mainland neighbour in what observers of political and international histories have since called 
a "regional restructuring."78 The imperial capital of Tokyo was, by 1929, the new hub of political 
relations between nations with interests in East Asia. Certainly, the diplomatic corps of the 
Japanese capital had existed in official form since the 'opening up' of Japan to foreign trade and 
relations in the late nineteenth century.79 The arriving Canadians would therefore need to jockey 
for position amongst the international powers already established in the city. Describing Tokyo's 
diplomatic corps of elite foreign representatives, James P. Manion, a junior member of the Trade 
Commissioner Service who worked alongside the External Affairs staff at the legation, 
remembered the "peculiar sort of intimacy which is inherent in the semi-colonial atmosphere 
which such a restricted community then lived."80 Self-contained and insular, its members stuck 
together, rarely connecting with the local Japanese communities as the foreign residents engaged 
in business or missionary work did. Their rigid system of making and returning 'calls' with one 
another guaranteed that for even the most recent arrival there was "created in short a 
confraternity ensuring close consultation at all levels of diplomatic life."81 The diplomatic corps 
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thus indulged and protected the elite privilege of the foreign representatives in Tokyo, setting the 
stage for the three Canadians to perform and project their national, political identities – as they 
each understood them – alongside the world's leading powers for the very first time.
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Chapter 1 – Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside: The Autonomist Academic 
The first Canadian diplomatic representative to Japan was Hugh Llewellyn Keenleyside who, on 
20 May 1929, arrived in Tokyo to establish the Canadian Legation. He was thirty years old and 
only one year into a career at External when he left for Japan ahead of his minister as the 
legation's First Secretary and chargé d'affaires. His appointment to Tokyo reflected the interests 
of Skelton and King in establishing Canada's diplomatic presence in East Asia. It also showed 
their confidence in Keenleyside's ability, not only to manage the myriad details involved in the 
opening of the offices but also to officially project an agreeable image of the Dominion and its 
diplomacy into the region for the first time. While the new legation was an important step for 
Dominion autonomy in foreign policy, neither the Prime Minister's office nor External was 
prepared to manage its operations directly. With few instructions from Ottawa and limited means 
of communication between the capitals, Keenleyside navigated the first four months as head of 
mission almost entirely on his own. Moreover, with no pre-existing structures of administration 
on which to rely, Keenleyside's experiences in Tokyo were shaped by his own discretion and 
individual autonomy in ways unmatched by any other Canadian diplomat up to that point. That 
September, after all his independent work and with the arrival of his minister as well as his wife 
and child, Keenleyside adapted the same individual autonomy he used to establish a place for 
Canada in the Japanese capital to build a life for himself and his family, striking a balance 
between time spent in and away from the legation and diplomatic corps in Tokyo. 
 For the delicate task of opening a new mission in a region where, up to 1929, Canadian 
political interests were managed by British delegates, Keenleyside proved a contentious choice. 
On the subject of separate, autonomous Dominion representation in foreign relations, his views 
aligned with Skelton's.1 His critical view of Canadians' imperialism shaped both his aspirations 
for the new diplomatic mission and his interpretation of the Liberal government's aspirations. 
This fact is reflected in Keenleyside's writings about his time in Japan; he was the only one of 
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Canada's first three diplomats posted to Tokyo to publish an account of his experiences there. 
Keenleyside's record of the inauguration of Canadian-Japanese diplomatic relations provides an 
invaluable look into a period and region otherwise obscured for a lack of perspectives of 
diplomats 'on the ground' in Tokyo. Complemented by a selection of archived letters and 
interviews, as well as official, diplomatic reports, academic essays, and speeches, Keenleyside's 
depictions offer the most comprehensive account of the history of diplomatic society and 
practice in Tokyo after 1929. Moreover, they confirm his personal opinions and processes of 
identification from this period while indirectly illuminating the motives of his supervisors in the 
Canadian diplomatic service – namely Marler, Skelton, and King. These sources therefore 
provide evidence of not only the personal autonomy enjoyed by Keenleyside and his colleagues 
in the daily operations of the Canadian legation to Tokyo, but also that which allowed the 
Canadians in Tokyo to act in accordance to their own personal views and politics in the capital 
and in Japanese society more generally.  
 In a region with no history of Canadian representation or official, governmental presence, 
Keenleyside managed not only the institution he was charged with establishing, but also his own 
personal experience of his host city and society. More specifically, his avoidance of the British 
delegates and institutions – his rejection of the sole possible source of precedent or instruction 
for Canada in the Japanese capital – was significant in so far as it freed him to interpret and 
decide how to present Canada to the international, political community at Tokyo. He ensured that 
Canadian representation in Japan was separate and autonomous from the beginning. For these 
reasons, Keenleyside's case offers an instructive starting point for analysis of the circumstances 
under which he and his colleagues lived and worked after 1929, while at the same time acting as 
a veritable gauge to make sense of the parallel experiences of Kirkwood and Marler. 
 
Early Life 
Hugh Keenleyside was born in Toronto on 7 July 1898. Shortly after his birth, his father, a North 
American Life Assurance Company employee, was transferred to Vancouver and the family 
relocated. Thereafter, he lived in the city's West End, amongst the hardly developed 
neighbourhood's old-growth trees and sparse, wooden structures. Keenleyside was introduced to 
Chinese and Japanese culture by the burgeoning immigrant communities of Chinatown and 
'Japantown' on the opposite side of the city center – the latter a lesser-known settlement of 
 30 
 
Japanese workers and families around Powell Street, east of what is now Main Street.2 Compared 
to his colleagues at Tokyo, Keenleyside was aware of the real, day-to-day conditions and 
challenges faced by Japanese and East Asian immigrant populations in Vancouver, as well as the 
strained labour relations they experienced with the city's white majority. Though only nine years 
old at the time, he remembered the 1907 anti-Asian riots in that city; from then on he was 
conscious of the overtly racist, anti-Asian sentiment prevalent in western Canada. 
 Growing up as an only son with two sisters, Keenleyside was also made aware of the 
struggles of women in Canadian society. Learning from the experiences of the women in his 
immediate family, Keenleyside became an advocate for greater gender equity across the various 
cultures with which he later came into contact.3 This critical gaze on the structures of power in 
the world around him, adopted at a young age and honed throughout his early life and education, 
remained with him, influencing his later politics and actions while a foreign officer at the 
Canadian legation in Tokyo. He remained a vocal critic of historical as well as contemporary 
examples of reactionary racism and sexism in Canada for his entire life.4  
 Keenleyside attended the University of British Columbia, graduating in 1920.5 While still 
an undergraduate at UBC, Keenleyside met Katherine Hall Pillsbury. They were engaged and 
moved together to New England where Katherine completed further studies at Simmons College. 
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Meanwhile, Keenleyside studied history at Clark University, obtaining a PhD in 1925. He later 
published his dissertation as Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the 
Republic and the Dominion.6 Keenleyside spent the mid-twenties lecturing at Penn State and 
Brown Universities while still a student. He and Pillsbury were married in BC in 1924 after 
Keenleyside returned to his adopted hometown of Vancouver to teach at UBC.7 Becoming "more 
and more conscious of the complexity of human society and the difficulty of coming to any 
important and satisfactory conclusions as to what was historically true," he left UBC and the 
discipline after only two years. He worked in publishing in Toronto before being enticed by the 
Department of External Affair's call for applicants in 1928. 
 Keenleyside wrote exams for the positions of first and third secretary. Although each 
exam was comprised of different questions, the examination processes were identical – so too 
was the stipulation that the candidate be male.8 He scored in the top three for both competitions, 
ranking behind Lester Pearson for the position of first secretary and Kenneth Kirkwood for third. 
Determined to increase the number of men in External with post-graduate degrees, Skelton and 
King found Keenleyside – a proven scholar with international experience – a model candidate for 
the senior position.9 Moreover, the pair valued Keenleyside's west coast background. He 
interviewed in the capital and his experience thereafter demonstrated the personal interest and 
hands-on involvement Mackenzie King had in the Department's hiring process; before offering 
Keenleyside either of the positions available, King personally met and dined with him. The 
young historian joined the department in September 1928 as a first secretary. Having witnessed 
the very tensions that had influenced the earlier government's decision to initiate diplomatic 
connections with Japan in the first place, Keenleyside was made a de facto specialist on East 
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Asia while at Ottawa.10 After spending the fall and early winter working in Ottawa on a variety 
of assignments, he was approached by Skelton on the subject of Canada's impending diplomatic 
mission to Tokyo.  
 Before departing for Japan, Keenleyside visited the Washington legation. There he 
realized which aspects of Canadian society and policy were "valuable in emphasizing," 
meanwhile noting which practises his colleagues in Tokyo "should avoid rather than emulate." 
Keenleyside noted that the Washington mission suffered for its minister Vincent Massey's 
despondency – he felt that Massey was more interested in socializing than managing the legation 
staff. Moreover, the office appeared disorganized and inefficient.11 These observations 
strengthened his own values and views of how diplomacy should be conducted. An effective 
mission, Keenleyside decided, would represent the nation to all levels of local society, 
meanwhile maintaining orderly and responsive administration. The former initiative directed 
Keenleyside's management of the Tokyo legation's accessibility and image – aspects of its 
operations which resembled community outreach. To ensure the new legation ran with order and 
efficiency, Keenleyside prepared a rigorous filing system (which, he was proud to note, was in 
use there until at least the 1960s), challenged himself to acknowledge all correspondence within 
48-hours or less, and prepared plans for an office space more utilitarian than gaudy.12 
Furthermore, he became all the more resolute in his belief that alcohol was a wasteful use of tax 
payers' dollars. This view was undoubtedly influenced by his and Katherine's own adherence to 
strict abstinence from alcohol throughout this period. As his colleagues liked to note, this 
                                                 
10
 Reflecting on the demographics of his own application cycle, as well as the many subsequent ones he 
administered, Keenleyside explained: "Time after time our examining boards found applicants from Ontario and 
Quebec who had visited the eastern United States, Britain, France, and other European countries but knew little of 
the Maritimes and nothing of the West. [. . .] Most of the candidates from the central provinces were young people 
with exceptional intellectual, social, and in many instances, financial resources, but apparently they saw nothing 
incongruous in seeking to represent abroad the country about which they knew or apparently cared so little. And yet 
central Canadians wonder why the West and the Maritimes so often seem disaffected!" Keenleyside, Hammer the 
Golden Day, 224. 
11
 Canada's Minister to America in 1928 was Vincent Massey. Keenleyside recalled him to be "the essence of 
courtesy and kindness" though "not very greatly concerned with the kinds of problems with which the legation staff 
was required to deal." Keenleyside, Hammer the Golden Day, 247-8. 
12
 See: Ibid., 279, 281; Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, 122. 
 33 
 
practice brought with it a nickname from those who paid visit to Keenleyside's drink-free office 
and home: "Canada Dry," a name derived from his favourite alternative to alcohol.13   
 
Recording History as a National Representative 
Keenleyside carefully documented his experiences in Tokyo. After departing Vancouver for 
Tokyo in May, 1929, he kept a journal.14 As he later explained, the journal was "to serve as a 
safety valve" for opinions or feelings that might compromise the image of the nation and 
institution he represented. As the first Canadian with diplomatic authority in Tokyo, Keenleyside 
took very seriously the "necessity of avoiding any public expression of too candid or emphatic 
views on people or events, especially Japanese people or events."15 Voiced expressions of his 
personal views were from then on restricted to house, family, and diary. Only there could he 
speak and act entirely on his own behalf, he thought. At all other times Keenleyside saw himself 
as symbol of Canadian government and autonomy, a public figure performing for foreign 
observers a newfound national image in place of the persistent and formerly mainstream imperial 
or colonial identities.  
 Together with his conceptions of Canadian national identity, autonomy, and nationalism, 
Keenleyside's own processes of identification were intrinsic to his role as first secretary and 
chargé d'affaires of the Tokyo legation. Canada, he thought, much like its Commonwealth 
counterparts around the world, was comprised of its own distinct cultures, languages, and politics. 
In his mind, its nationhood was the product of its people and their own social and political 
development. For these reasons, Keenleyside believed that there could be no "single voice" in 
foreign affairs for the entirety of the Commonwealth, and that separate and autonomous 
representation abroad for each of its member states was not only appropriate but in fact 
necessary.16 Also necessary was the abolition of all prior forms of British domination over its 
former territories and subjects. He saw Canada's relation to England as a voluntary union of 
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sovereign states capable of separate unilateral decisions in domestic as well as external affairs. 
This conceptualization of Canada's place within the new, decentralized British Commonwealth 
guided him in his determined efforts to expand Dominion independence abroad and anticipated 
the developments which followed the Statute of Westminster. 
 His understanding of Liberal party aspirations for Canadian foreign policy similarly 
informed his actions. According to Keenleyside, the legation was not only an experiment in 
foreign policy with legal, constitutional implications for the wider Commonwealth – it was also 
the result of King's personal interests. Keenleyside respected King's appreciation for trade 
potential in Japan. Finally, the diplomatic mission was seen as bridge into China, a somewhat 
more slowly developing market of immeasurably larger potential.17 He therefore understood the 
importance of economics and immigration, two issues which, following Marler's arrival that fall, 
busied him the most. Keenleyside knew firsthand the need for an immigration policy limiting the 
number of Japanese landing on British Columbian shores, at least superficially, in order to 
appease racist calls for a complete ban on Asian immigration.18 Most of all, however, he 
appreciated the power of individual affinities and tastes. Keenleyside recalled that King's visit to 
the Japanese capital after the Vancouver riots in 1907 made Tokyo the East Asian city most 
familiar to the prime minister. Himself struck by a lifelong affinity for Tokyo and its surrounding 
area after 1929, Keenleyside sympathized with a Prime Minister who had "brought his personal 
influence to bear on the matter" of opening the third Canadian legation – his flagship mission in 
the pacific – in Tokyo rather than Shanghai, Peking or the Nationalist Party's (Kuomintang) 
recently established capital at Nanjing. He understood how Tokyo and Japan's natural beauty 
could influence the views of a Canadian.19 
 
Early Work in Tokyo 
With all of Skelton and King's confidence came freedoms of decision making and management 
of the legation's operations in the first months before Marler's arrival. Keenleyside was able to 
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apply his own personal knowledge and experiences to the circumstances of Canada's 
representation in Tokyo. With "no instructions beyond Skelton's advice to use his head and, if 
difficulties arose, to consult Ottawa by cable," historian John Hilliker argues that Keenleyside 
acted "according to his inclinations" as chargé d'affaires, seeking, for example, "to establish 
rather greater distance from the British embassy at the start of operations than had been done in 
Washington or Paris."20 This freedom did come with its downfalls, however. He soon expressed 
frustrations over Ottawa's apparent lack of interest in replying to the legation's many letters and 
cables.21 Although he did check with Ottawa for guidance in turning down Sir John Tilley's offer 
to be received as the British Ambassador's guest at Tokyo, Keenleyside thereafter acted of his 
own volition, taking King and Skelton's first instructions to avoid close association with the 
British to heart and applying similar discretion through the coming summer.22 The Canadian 
government, he reasoned, "felt it important to ensure from the start that neither the Japanese nor 
London should be allowed to feel that our legation was in any way subject to the authority of the 
British legation."23 This became the guiding principle of Keenleyside's public and professional 
role in Tokyo. Far outnumbering him, however, the British embassy staff was irregularly 
involved in the early meetings and arrangements following Keenleyside's disembarking at the 
bay of Tokyo. Their presence and offers of assistance, however benevolent or apolitical they 
might have been, nevertheless tested his rigid interpretation of Skelton's vague instructions to 
keep away and emphasize separateness of missions.24 
 The spring and summer months of 1929 were thus entirely Keenleyside's own. It was 
during his time as chargé d'affaires that Keenleyside hosted an event which proved to be the 
most symbolic and memorable display to date of Canadian national identity and distinctiveness 
in any part of East Asia. On 1 July 1929, the Canadian ensign was raised and a recording of 'O 
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Canada' was played as a number of Canadian and Japanese attended for the first time an official 
event hosted by an official representative of the Canadian government to Japan.25 An example of 
his motivation and, indeed, his personal desire to promote Canada abroad, Keenleyside's 
Dominion Day celebrations were characteristic of the pride and professionalism he demonstrated 
as the legation's first secretary in the years that followed. He adopted these practises by 
becoming a public figure outside of the office, participating in the associations of Canadian 
missionaries, teachers, and entrepreneurs. As Meehan notes, Keenleyside's repeated displays of 
tact in the promotion of Canadian national imagery impressed and pleased Skelton.26 
 Provided a blank canvas and freedom to do as he pleased, Keenleyside exercised his 
autonomy in action by emphasizing Canadian sovereignty and national identity to both Japanese 
and international observers in Tokyo. Whereas the Paris and Washington missions had evolved 
from previous, smaller operations into fully fledged legations, the Tokyo mission was an entirely 
new venture. Keenleyside recognized this opportunity and made the claim for Canadian 
autonomy in operations and representation at the earliest possible opportunity.27 He chose the 
first offices himself and while announcing its location and name refused the British suggestion 
that he introduce the institution as "la Légation du Gouvernment de sa Majesté Britannique au 
Canada." He opted instead for the more succinct "la Légation du Canada," a decision he justified 
with the (inevitably correct) belief that Skelton would not disapprove.28  
 The offices he selected were located in the Nagai compound, an international 
neighbourhood just north of Shibuya Station in what was then a quiet area on the edge of central 
Tokyo. With a residency on their second floor, he believed the building to be suitable for 
Marler's September arrival. Ultimately, Keenleyside's tastes did not match with his minister's and, 
upon their arrival, rather than move in directly upon arrival to the Japanese capital, Herbert 
Meredith and Beatrice Isabel Marler went to the Imperial Hotel while the residence was brought 
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up to their standards.29 The minister's otherwise smooth and tactful transition into his newly 
established post alongside the long since established British presence, however, can be attributed 
to Keenleyside's determined efforts to present Canada as separate. The first secretary prided 
himself on this accomplishment and he worked hard to utilize the connections he had established 
that summer to ensure Marler's early public appearances reflected the distance and balance of his 
legation's relationship with the British authorities.30 Keenleyside's connections with Canadian 
residents of Japan provided him with resources to ensure that balance. He was always prepared 
to ensure a Canadian audience for his minister's public appearances, projecting the image of a 
strong sense of nationhood, even on the opposite side of the Pacific. 
 
Inequalities, Critical Perspectives, and Lasting Relationships  
Of his own Canadian identity, Keenleyside was unabashedly proud. Meanwhile, he maintained a 
critical eye turned inward, demonstrating in his letters and in his personal and published writings 
an awareness of his own privilege as a white, male Canadian.31 He was in part motivated to write 
his memoirs by his perception that, as a civil servant in the Department of External Affairs, he 
had participated in work that was, "in its objectives at least, [. . .] worthy of approval." This, he 
said, "assuaged to some degree the strings of conscience" that made him wonder about his own 
"entitlement to the luxuries of life when so many others of equal or greater desert have suffered" 
for poverty and want.32 He expressed a desire to affect change and improve the lives of those 
who struggled on the margins of society in a way that few other diplomats in the early-twenties – 
his colleagues at Tokyo included – ever did. His class and gender consciousness influenced his 
motivation to expand his role as a public figure while abroad, leading him to interact with 
associations and individuals across a wide spectrum of society. 
 Of the three Canadian diplomats, Keenleyside had the closest and most constant 
connection with the Japanese public during his posting to Tokyo. On his evenings and weekends, 
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he mixed with many Canadian missionaries and teachers, many of whom had already lived and 
worked in Japan for decades by 1929. Attending meetings held by the YMCA, entrepreneurs, as 
well as teachers and missionaries' associations, Hugh and Katherine Keenleyside learned about 
Japanese culture and society from Canadians who lived, taught, proselytised, and traded across 
rural Japan as well as occupied Korea and Taiwan. Many of them spoke Japanese. It was through 
them that Keenleyside was introduced to the array of cultures and conditions spread throughout 
the archipelago. "As a member of the staff of the Canadian legation and a representative of my 
country abroad," he wrote to his Japanese publisher, "I was given an enviable opportunity [. . .] 
to observe notable and varied aspects of Japanese life through contact with many members of the 
business, military, educational, and government communities."33 Recognizing the value of these 
contacts' knowledge of Japanese culture and society – indeed, at times appreciating them over 
the appointed political and economic delegates who remained largely ignorant of actual social 
and political conditions there – Keenleyside utilized them in his official work for the legation 
and while navigating public life in Japan. When on fact-finding missions, such as those to Korea 
and Manchuria, for example, he benefitted from their intimate relations with locals when making 
his reports. Meanwhile, when vacationing with his wife and children, his family was afforded a 
more humble, private experience with good company and quiet reprieve from the incessant 
business and formalities of the diplomatic community. 
 As the only diplomatic secretary openly critical of the discriminatory policies of many of 
the western nations, Keenleyside's accounts of his first years at Tokyo are interspersed with 
episodes of disagreement with the racist views of his (usually senior) colleagues across the 
Canadian, British, and American diplomatic services.34 Keenleyside sympathized with Japanese 
officials who repeatedly lambasted the racist, exclusionist immigration policies of Canada, 
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Australia, and America.35 He was critical of views of natural or innate racial superiority, rejecting 
the tendencies of the older English (and, by extension, Canadian) imperialists to look down upon 
"the lesser breeds" and "lower classes."36  
 Seeing firsthand the factories, mines, and fields of East Asia had a deep impact on 
Keenleyside's already sympathetic views towards the world's labouring or impoverished 
populations. His perceptions of the conditions facing the working classes of Japan stuck with 
him after these years. He published his second book on the education system in Japan in 1937, 
thereafter giving a number of speeches on the subject in Canada.37 For his engagement with 
people of varied economic backgrounds, Keenleyside distinguished himself from his colleagues 
as an individual who was conscious of the people and society around him. Later in life, while 
assisting historian Klaus Pringsheim with his manuscript on the history of a century of Canadian-
Japanese relations, Keenleyside made sure to highlight the civil injustices faced by the Japanese 
in Canada throughout the early twentieth century. He also encouraged the author to resist 
criticisms emanating from External's Historical Department regarding the history of racial 
prejudice in domestic as in foreign Canadian policy.38  
 Despite never learning Japanese – having been assured by External before his departure 
for Tokyo that he would only be there for six months, he decided not to devote serious time to 
studying – Keenleyside made and maintained relationships with a number of high-level Japanese 
government officials during his stay.39 In this regard, his private life in Tokyo represents yet 
another stark departure from the rather isolated experiences of Marler and Kirkwood, whose 
personal relationships with native residents of the city and nation extended no further than their 
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housekeepers and cooks. Indeed, as he recalled in his memoirs, "[n]ext to the pleasures of 
exploring the Japanese countryside and becoming acquainted with its people and their ways, the 
most important activities of our [he and Katherine's] years in Japan come from our contacts with 
officials of the government and leaders in the worlds of business and the professions."40 Most 
notable of his relationships with Japanese elites were those shared with Yoshida Shigeru and 
Prince Chichibu. Both continue to enjoy powerful and lasting legacies in Japan. Yoshida is 
remembered as the creator of Japan's more liberal pre- and post-war foreign policies and for 
orchestrating his country's recovery from that conflict while Prime Minister 1946 to 1947 and 
1948 to 1954. Chichibu was the Emperor Taisho's second son and his role as purveyor of Anglo-
Japanese and Western-Japanese exchange has not been forgotten. Returning to Japan to visit in 
1951, Keenleyside was the guest of Yoshida Shigeru, then Prime Minister, who remembered and 
contacted him, insisting that he visit his home as his personal guest.41 On the occasion of Prince 
Chichibu's early death, Keenleyside was asked to provide a chapter for publication in a 
commemorative collection.42 
 
Diplomacy and Work under Herbert Marler 
As his minister remained resolutely interested in transpacific trade after 1929, much of 
Keenleyside's work within the legation related to reports on economic and industrial conditions 
in Japan and its empire. His connections with Japanese and Canadian industrialists, entrepreneurs, 
and public figures in Japan and East Asia helped Keenleyside survey the economic conditions 
there for Marler and External. While Marler appreciated the first secretary's reporting, the pair's 
conflicting views regarding the most fundamental aspects of diplomatic practice – observance of 
etiquette and formalities, for example – caused a number of disagreements between them. The 
first of these conflicts came when Keenleyside's learned of the minister's plan to outfit his staff in 
the British diplomatic uniform tradition. The feathered hat, together with an "implausible" sword, 
tested Keenleyside's patience and aggravated his preference for modesty in presentation and 
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appearances. Although he acquiesced to his minister's demands and did purchase the suit, it 
remained his most memorable example of the difference of opinions amongst Canadian 
diplomats as to their rightful image and behaviours from this period.43 As he did not censure 
himself when writing, entertaining sketches of these differences of opinion and character 
between minister and first secretary are spread across a number of the pages of his memoirs.44 To 
these descriptions, Marler's son Howard replied in 1986 that "savagely critical" views of his 
father stemmed from Keenleyside's misreading of the minister's "demanding attention to detail 
and his devotion to perfection in all his actions as arrogant pomposity."45  
 Keenleyside's modesty and humility were only amplified by the presence of his pompous, 
arrogant Minister. The pair's contrasting values did however benefit the legation as an institution 
seeking to establish a place and identity amongst international powers in Tokyo. With the British 
already long since established amongst the diplomatic corps at Tokyo, Marler's ability to indulge 
the more ceremonial delegates with his own ostentations and patrician manners pleased high 
members of the imperial court or diplomatic community. Meanwhile, in times when the 
minister's actions appeared unsympathetic or gaudy, Keenleyside's approachability and humility 
evened things out. Invariably, their disagreements carried on behind closed doors.  
 In keeping with the subject of his PhD dissertation and first book, Keenleyside's views 
were defined largely by Canada's position in relation to The United States. He thus experienced 
several more conflicts of opinion regarding Japanese militarism and the appropriate Canadian 
position and response to it, as Marler's views leaned much more consistently in favour of British 
policies.46 This too, however, had a balancing effect as Marler's distrust of American business 
culture, together with his affinity for Victorianisms, kept his attention diverted. Nevertheless, 
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Keenleyside, always separating work from the personal aspects of his life, remembered his 
former minister as a generally "kind, appreciative, and generous man."47 
 
Conclusion 
While legation first secretary, Keenleyside mixed regularly with his fellow diplomats in the 
Japanese capital. Despite his austere attitude toward luxuries and excess, socializing amongst the 
diplomatic corps at Tokyo was neither a distraction nor a wasteful practise, he insisted. He and 
his colleagues at Tokyo "enjoyed an occasional official function." Nevertheless, it was, he 
maintained, "difficult to recall anyone who would have put such events high on his list of 
priorities."48 With two children and a still growing family in Tokyo, Keenleyside balanced his 
social calendar with other, household responsibilities; while his younger colleague Kenneth 
Kirkwood attended the opera and theatre, Keenleyside travelled exploring the local mountains 
and coastline. His memoirs are filled with descriptions of the sights and sounds of the Japanese 
countryside then so easily accessed by short jaunts from central Tokyo. With him in nearly all of 
these trips was his wife and, whenever possible, his children.49 Besides spending time with his 
family, he had numerous obligations to various sporting teams and associations – another 
practice which filled Keenleyside's time away from the office and distinguished him from his 
two legation colleagues.50 
 The freedoms afforded to Keenleyside by Skelton and King's confidence, together with 
the absence of any precedents for Canadian representation in Tokyo, allowed him to claim for 
himself and for the legation an autonomous space in which to live and work. Moreover, with the 
arrival of his young family and his general disinterest in alcohol or high culture – two central 
features of diplomatic practice in Tokyo in 1929 – he found fulfilment in a schedule he balanced 
with a public role in the diplomatic corps by day and a private life he built around his family and 
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 Keenleyside's many pointed criticisms of Marler revolved around his obsession with appearances which, owing to 
his humble, Methodist upbringing, Keenleyside simply could not identify with. Keenleyside, Hammer the Golden 
Day, 290. For his seemingly unending anguish over appearances and workaholic tendencies, however, Keenleyside 
elsewhere remembered his former minister with what he called a "personal sympathy." Keenleyside to Dr. W. Kaye 
Lamb, 14 January, 1982, HLK fonds, MG 31 E 102, Vol.1, File 19, LAC. 
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 Keenleyside, Hammer the Golden Day, 232. 
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 See Keenleyside, Hammer the Golden Day, especially chapter 11: "Life Abroad.” 
50
 Keenleyside played in net when the Canadians around Tokyo answered the local university students' challenge for 
a game of ice hockey. Manion, A Canadian Errant, 33. 
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a few close friends on evenings and weekends. His individual freedoms thus extended beyond 
the office and beyond the position to which King and Skelton had appointed him. Although he 
knew little of "the way people lived" in Japan before his appointment, during his first years there 
he sought connections with people outside the diplomatic corps of Tokyo. It was in these 
moments that he realized the aspects of his Japanese experience that would have the deepest and 
most lasting effect on him. For all his achievements in opening Canada's first diplomatic mission 
in the Pacific world, and for establishing it with such unprecedented levels of autonomy from 
Britain, it was his experiences amongst the natural geography and tranquil environments 
surrounding Tokyo that he remembered most warmly for the remainder of his life. In his 
accounts of those years, he reflected numerous times on the impressiveness of the environments 
– urban, as well as rural – that he visited. One exemplary description is found in a 1977 interview. 
In it, he explained: 
One of my happier recollections of Tokyo and Japan is of the beauty of 
its natural environment, and of a mood and an atmosphere such as would 
be evoked by a moonlit summer night with a cool breeze, and as the 
crickets chirp you hear the sound of a lone shakukachi (flute) drifting 
over from a nearby house.51  
 Perhaps most importantly, however, Keenleyside's experiences in Tokyo are 
demonstrative of matters that extend far beyond his individual case. They help us understand the 
processes of political, international, and interpersonal exchanges undertaken at Tokyo by his 
contemporaries and colleagues. As the first Canadian diplomat to Japan and author of the only 
published firsthand account of the legation's earliest months and years, his insights provide the 
background against which the experiences of Marler and Kirkwood are best situated and 
understood. His politics, modesty, and connectedness in Japan were, after the fall of 1929, a 
benefit to both of his (comparatively self-absorbed and conflicted) Canadian colleagues at the 
Tokyo legation. Keenleyside was thus at once the founder and the foundation of Canadian 
representation in the Japanese capital, East Asia, and the greater Pacific world. It is only because 
of his work across the late spring and summer of 1929 that the institution was able to provide its 
diplomats the freedom from the influences which had for so long relegated the interests of 
Canada – and the Canadians charged with representing it – to the periphery of international 
relations. By the time he met his colleagues at the docks on the Bay of Tokyo in September, 
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 44 
 
1929, he had already cleared the way for them to pursue an autonomous role for themselves, 
meanwhile furthering just such a role for their nation. The divergent experiences of Marler and 
Kirkwood, each demonstrative of important aspects of individual as well as collective, national 




Chapter 2 – Herbert Meredith Marler: The Conflicted Imperialist-Nationalist 
Through his experiences as Canadian Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan 
from 1929, Herbert Meredith Marler personified the paradoxes of Canada's first diplomatic 
venture into East Asia. Furthermore, the distinct processes of identification Marler brought with 
him and employed in his role as minister in Tokyo reflected divergent sets of interests then 
prevalent within elite, Anglophone Canadian society. Steeped in historical conceptions of 
citizenship and empire, Marler – together with a number of Canada's established elites – faced 
the challenge of renegotiating his social and political positions in response to new streams of 
autonomism and nationalism in Canada. Throughout this period, he retained an appreciation for 
empire and Great Britain engrained in him by the elite Anglophone circles of Montreal in which 
he had grown up. The conflicted nature of his imperialism was thereby indicative of aspects of 
the late-Victorian period that still lingered in 1929. Nevertheless, in performing his role as the 
first Canadian minister to Japan, Marler was a purveyor of Canadian autonomy in international 
affairs and a trailblazer for the very causes that undermined his own claims to traditional forms 
of authority and privilege. In the fall of 1929, as Herbert Marler assumed his role as the first 
Canadian Minister to Japan, a conflicted, dualistic identity went on display for the eyes of 
Canada, the Commonwealth, and the world. Meanwhile, as a representative of Canadian state 
and society in Japan, he projected the image of an emergent nation still grappling with its own 
conflicted identity. 
 Although he derived his status and privilege from his English, imperialist background, 
Marler's mission in Tokyo was not always congruent with this identity. In representing Canada 
amongst foreign powers at Tokyo, he spoke and worked entirely in the name of Canadian 
interests. When challenged by multilateral politics, however, he proved himself enduringly 
British in his preferences. Nevertheless, he rarely distinguished between these two seemingly 
conflicting loyalties. Nor did he relegate one or the other to the private areas of his life. He kept 
no separate personal or professional sphere for himself as minister. Instead, Marler moved at 
once between the two 'sides' of his life with each of these loyalties in tow, unbothered by their 
inherent contradictions. Indeed, his own ability to demonstrate and embody Canadian 
autonomism abroad, while at once espousing imperial unity and the prosperity and predominance 
of the English crown, exemplified the unique individual freedoms afforded him as an elite, 
appointed citizen and subject in Tokyo. Given this freedom, he was able to escape pressures to 
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abandon either his appreciation for empire or his government's push for Dominion political 
autonomy. 
 Perceptions of his self, together with those of the nation-state and society he represented, 
illuminate the ways Marler performed a narrowly conceptualized form of one emergent Canadian 
national identity on the global stage.1 Moreover, as his own presence in Tokyo symbolized a 
hitherto unprecedented level of Canadian autonomy in foreign relations, assessments of his 
actions originating from within and beyond the legation – including Marler's own self-reflection 
– demonstrate the diversity of critical, popular conceptions of Canada's place in the world after 
1929. Thus, Marler's life and work in Tokyo exemplify how Canadian interwar foreign policy in 
East Asia involved not only national politics, but also the thoughts, decisions, and actions of the 
individuals informing that policy. 
 
Early Life 
Herbert Meredith Marler was born 7 March 1876 in Montreal, Quebec. The son of a successful 
notary and professor of law, Marler graduated from the Montreal High School and received a 
degree in civil law from McGill University before joining his father's practice.2 Through his 
father William de Montmollin, a man who had himself derived wealth and authority from lands 
inherited from his own father, Marler enjoyed all connections and memberships to the city's most 
powerful people, associations, and clubs.3 In addition to his many professional achievements in 
Montreal society, he married Beatrice Isabel Allan, a descendant of Andrew Allan and Matthew 
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 This national identity lacked regard for the large number of diverse ethnic and social groups residing in Canada. 
Women, non-Christians, and non-whites were neither represented within the political ranks of External, nor were 
they the subjects of much discussion (official or otherwise) by its officers in Tokyo. The Canada these men (and 
Marler, in particular) represented was thus one narrow slice of the individuals who in fact inhabited that land. 
2
 Marler enjoyed the fruits of his father and grandfather's ascendancy from birth. The year he was born, his mother 
and father regularly sat for portraits at the Notman photography studio in Montreal, then a practice and marker of 
wealth and status. Herbert Meredith appears in the photography archives numerous times across the early years of 
his life, a reminder of his family's wealth as well as their desire to leave behind an impressive recorded, visual 
legacy. These numerous images are housed in the Notman Photographic Archives at the McCord Museum in 
Montreal. 
3
 For more on Marler's life in Quebec, as well as the Marler men who came before him, see Meehan, "Herbert 
Marler: The Tokyo Legation and Canada's Pacific Debut, 1929-1936," in Architects and Innovators, 111-3; Eber H. 
Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler and the Canadian Legation in Tokyo," in Canada and Japan in The Twentieth Century, 
75-84; and Jason Butters, "Sir Herbert Meredith Marler: The Life and Lineage of a Montreal Patrician," in Past 
Tense: Graduate Review of History Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2016): 38-66. 
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Hamilton Gault, two of nineteenth-century Canada’s most eminent capitalists.4 With his marriage 
into the Allan family, Marler expanded his own social standing and authority by building upon 
privilege endowed to him by his father. From 1921 to 1925, while a Liberal Member of 
Parliament, he became close with William Lyon Mackenzie King, developing a friendship that 
would later benefit him in his pursuit of still more prestige. These achievements elevated not 
only his personal status, but also that of a lineage now representative of a multi-generational 
patrician family.5 
 Further solidifying his patrician status, Marler purchased and cultivated real estate across 
southern Quebec. The centrepiece of these efforts was his Grantham Hall estate in 
Drummondville, constructed at the very site where his grandfather had founded the Marler 
family legacy by initiating his professional ascent. He envisioned the property as a "base" from 
which future generations of Marler men – thereafter becoming a part of what he called a 
"dynasty" – would "continue to build the family fortunes." Remembering the estate, Marler's son 
described it as "England transported to a remote corner of a new land."6 Together with his 
Senneville and Square Mile manors, the properties represented their proprietor's appreciation for 
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 Andrew Allan prospered alongside his family members in the steamship and cargo business. Matthew Hamilton 
Gault was founder of the Sun Life Assurance Company. See Gordon Burr, "Allan, Andrew," in Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, vol. 13 (Toronto and Laval: University of Toronto/Universite Laval, 2003), accessed 25 
August, 2016, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/allan_andrew_13E.html.; Gladys Barbara Pollack and Gerald J. J. 
Tulchinsky, "Gault, Mathew Hamilton," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 11 (Toronto and Laval: 
University of Toronto/Universite Laval, 1982), accessed 25 August, 2016, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/gault_mathew_hamilton_11E.html.; Beatrice Isabel Marler died in Montreal in 1968. 
"Lady Marler," obituary, Montreal Gazette, 18 July, 1968, 35.  
5
 It was during William de Montmollin Marler's lifetime that Montreal surpassed Quebec City as the economic 
center of Lower Canada. William de Montmollin's management of both property and career accelerated his 
ascension at this crucial time. As land was being commutated to Freehold tenure in the wake of the abolition of the 
seigneurial system, he profited from his own holdings and those of the Sulpicians of Montreal who held the rights to 
the entire island of Montreal. As their highest paid notary, William de Montmollin directed the commutation and 
sales of much of their. On this process and the impact of the seminary's status and wealth on the course of Montreal 
history then and after, see: Brian Young, In Its Corporate Capacity: the Seminary of Montreal as a Business 
Institution, 1816-1876 (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press). 
6
 Marler, Marler, 82, 85-6. Other estates included an impressive manor on Montreal's Redpath Crescent in the city's 
'Golden Square Mile,' as well as a "colonial style" estate at Senneville. Ibid., 104. The Redpath Crescent and 
Senneville structures remain standing today – the Drummondville estate later became a part of the Drummondville 
Golf and Country Club's facilities. Martin Bergevin, “Le Club de golf de Drummondville,” La Société D’Histoire de 
Drummond Défraie la Chronique, May 29, 2014, accessed December 1, 2014, 
http://www.histoiredrummond.com/Chroniques/le-club-degolf-de-drummondville; Meehan, "Herbert Marler: The 
Tokyo Legation and Canada's Pacific Debut, 1929-1936," 111. On earlier examples of this practise of bringing "an 
English noble aesthetic to Lower Canada," see Colin M. Coates, The Metamorphoses of Landscape and Community 
in Early Quebec (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 146-51. 
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family heritage, imposing architecture, the English value and prestige of landed wealth, as well 
as the cultivation of one's outward appearance and image. Although he tried his best to reproduce 
these impressions in Japan, it took several years and hundreds of thousands of dollars to purchase 
the appropriate land and erect the structures he saw fit.7 Nevertheless, as in Montreal, Marler 
produced a structural, material legacy – the legation building and minister's residence he 
constructed at Tokyo in 1933 remains the home of the Canadian Ambassador today.8 
 Accepting King's appointment as Canada's first Minister to Japan in 1929, Marler 
eclipsed the reach and authority of his patrician predecessors, expanding his privilege beyond the 
local and even national level, projecting it onto the global stage of high, international diplomacy. 
By the 1930s – the last decade of his life9 – Herbert Marler was one of only a handful of 
Canadian-born patricians to have successfully made such a transition.10 His experiences at Tokyo 
from 1929 to 1933 represent the high-water mark and coda in the history of Quebec patrician 
authority.11 From then on, the influence and authority enjoyed by Marler and his patrician 
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 Privately, Marler admitted that if "the average Canadian" could see the residences they now filled, he and his wife 
would "look like two very foolish people" for "giving up our two very beautiful houses in Canada and coming out to 
this country." Marler to Adelaide North (née Marler), 5 April, 1930, Herbert Meredith Marler fonds, MG30 E528, 
Vol. 1, LAC.  
8
 With the opening of a new and consolidated legation and minister's residence in 1933, Marler completed his 
primary real estate and construction venture in Japan. Now named 'Marler House,' the land and structure remain 
alongside the new embassy in Minato ward, one of the city's most exclusive neighbourhoods. The history of this 
building, its construction as well as its importance as a site of political, economic, cultural, and social exchange ever 
since, has been well covered. See: Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler, 75-84; Mary Taylor, "Marler House in Tokyo," in Bout 
de papier vol. 11, no. 1 (1994), 8-10; J.H. Taylor, "A Base for Promoting Canada's Interests," in Special Trust and 
Confidence: Envoy Essays in Canadian Diplomacy, ed. David Chalmer Reece (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1996), 255-268; Marie-Josée Therrien, "'This Proper and Dignified Accommodation:' The Marler 
House in Tokyo," in Society for the Study of Architecture in Canada: Bulletin Vol. 22, No. 3 (1997), 66-73; Therrien, 
"Canadian Chanceries in Tokyo," in Contradictory Impulses, 231-243. 
9
 Herbert Meredith Marler died 20 January 1940 in Montreal, having returned from his post as Canadian Minister to 
the Washington combatting illness allegedly stemming from overwork and fatigue. See the family history, Marler, 
Marler, 184-7. 
10
 Though the outward projection of prestige and authority, as derived from individual privilege, wealth, and social 
position, had been central to European and American traditions of international diplomacy since at least the early 
nineteenth century, Canadians had been shut out of bi-lateral or multi-lateral political exchanges between nation-
states up to this point as result their subordinate colonial- and later dominion status. 
11
 By adopting the term 'patrician' to describe the Marler men, I draw from the recent work of historian Brian Young 
on their elite nineteenth- and early-twentieth century contemporaries. As he explains, the term "reaches beyond 
material wealth and is suggestive of birth, the landed, hegemonies [… and w]ith its Greek roots in 'father,' […] is 
suggestive of both domestic masculinity and civic identities associated with 'fatherland.' In seeking social 
permanence, the patrician family gravitated to the customary, legal, and religious rights of the father, brushing by 
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counterparts atop Canadian society stagnated and diminished.12 Having begun to experience 
challenges to his position and authority in Montreal at the hands of a new generation of 
professionals and industrialists, Marler's transition to diplomacy allowed him to not only prolong 
his privileged position, it also allowed him to improve that position, if only temporarily, by way 
of the titles and decorations afforded to heads of missions during this period. When Mackenzie 
King offered him the appointment in January 1929, the Marlers were acutely aware of these 
possibilities. Meeting to confirm his friend's appointment to Tokyo, King wrote in his diary that 
it was "quite clear" that the aspect of the assignment most enticing to both Herbert and Beatrice 
Marler was the "social significance of the position."13 
 
Patrician Diplomat 
In the late 1980s – long after the upheavals of the Second World War marked the conclusion of 
the interwar period, and with it, the inherent authority of Canada's patrician elite – Marler's son 
Howard reflected on his father's career as a Canadian foreign minister. He wrote with a mix of 
nostalgia and bitterness, explaining that his father was “quite at home in the patrician 
environment in which diplomacy was conducted during that period when it was still the métier of 
gentlemen who were expected to have the appropriate educational and social background.”14 
Indeed Herbert Marler's social and political standing exceeded these qualifications. He already 
enjoyed the ample wealth and authority accumulated by his father through land ownership during 
                                                                                                                                                             
the presence of female family heads and the evident contribution of wives, widows, and daughters. Culture, custom, 
and religion determined that it was through male flesh that flowed name, profession, and legal priority. This focus 
on gender and authority in family and society, as opposed to a focus on great wealth, tacks us away from historians 
like Sven Beckert and interpretations based on the 'monied,' on 'the model of social relations of competitive 
capitalism,' and on a New York elite that come to be through 'the ownership of capital rather than heritage and birth.' 
Young, Patrician Families and the Making of Quebec, 5-6; Young is here quoting from Sven Beckert, The Monied 
Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850-1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 6, 321. 
12
 On the wartime and postwar shifts driving the specialization of the individual and the bureaucratization of the 
institution in Canadian public and private life, two processes historian Christopher Dummitt has argued were central 
to Canadian conceptions male authority, masculinity, and modernity in this period, see his The Manly Modern: 
Masculinity in Postwar Canada (Vancouver: UBCPress, 2007), 3-7. 
13
 W.L.M. King Diary, 5 January, 1929, MG26-J13, LAC. 
14
 Howard Marler lived with his parents at Tokyo before returning on his own to Canada to attend university. 
Having missed out on the authority and position he was otherwise set to inherit from his father, Howard's account 
reflects a longing for the society which, dismantled by the effects of the Second World War in Canada, he was 
himself never able to benefit from. Marler, Marler, 109.  
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Quebec's transition from seigneurial to freehold land tenure, as well as successive and skilful 
applications of Anglo-Canadian privilege in addition to his own acumen in navigating an 
industrializing and urbanizing Montreal society.15 Only his invitation to the Order of St. Michael 
and St. George on the recommendation of Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in 1935 (the last year a 
Canadian accepted such a title) surpassed the prestige of his appointments abroad.16 
 As the basis for his ascendant position in both public and private life, Marler's patrician 
identity permeated his entire character. Realizing his role and responsibilities in the Japanese 
capital as a culmination of his thirty years experience among Montreal and Ottawa's elite he 
made little effort to distinguish between a public and private sphere. Instead, he maximized his 
power and authority by applying them equally across the two dimensions of his life in Tokyo.17 
As minister, Marler joined the ranks of only two others atop the Department of External Affairs' 
foreign missions – themselves equally patrician in their manners and identities.18 He answered 
only to Under Secretary of State O.D. Skelton and the Prime Minister, although he was not 
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Little have identified their archetypical patrician subjects of biography. On the importance of prior, nineteenth 
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 Indeed the practice had already passed out of style under King's prior governments. In 1935, however, outbound 
PM Bennett submitted his recommendations to the Crown's offices in London, including Marler among a number 
more following the minister's many petitions for consideration. On the history of the relationship between Canadians 
and the processes of knighthood, as well as the importance and meaning of debates surrounding Canadian's 
acceptance of such titles in 1935, see Christopher McReery, "Questions of Honour: Canadian Government Policy 
Towards Titular Honours from Macdonald to Bennett" (Master's Thesis, Queen's University, 1999). On Marler's 
opinion of the "self-denying ordinance" regarding British titles adopted in Canada 1919, Prime Minister Bennett's 
disregard for that Liberal convention in 1934, and the glee of Herbert Meredith and his son Howard in the wake of 
this recommendation, see Marler, Marler, 159-161. See also: Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs, 164. 
As Keenleyside remarked in his diary on the news of Marler's knighting: with his "greatest wish" now gratified, 
"there may be no holding [Marler] now." Keenleyside, diary entry, 3 June, 1935, reprinted in Keenleyside, Hammer 
the Golden Day, 438. 
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 Marler's actions demonstrate that he shared with Vincent Massey – Canadian Minister to America and himself a 
patrician of similar type – the opinion that, as a foreign diplomat, one is working 24-hours a day. See Massey quoted 
in Kirkwood, Diplomat at Table, viii. 
18
 With his three appointed patricians – Marler at Tokyo, Vincent Massey at Washington, and Phillipe Roy in Paris – 
Mackenzie King boasted that Canada enjoyed "the beginning of a diplomatic service which ha[d] not been surpassed 
by any country in the world." Hilliker, Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 1, 117, quoting from King 
Papers, diary 5 January, 1929. 
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averse to bringing his concerns directly to King, owing not only to their friendship, but also to 
Marler's disregard for Skelton's unabashed autonomism and sometime anti-English attitudes.19 
 As the patrician head of a Quebec family of professional and public prominence, Marler 
felt he had certain advantages on the job over those climbing the social or professional ladder. 
He believed that lived experience amongst the moneyed leaders of productive society made a 
man. This was, of course, how his own father and grandfather before him made their 
achievements. Adapting to his new position in Tokyo, Marler wanted the legation to act as a 
training ground where the future generations of elite, Canadian patrician diplomats could learn 
from and emulate the best. Keenleyside recalled his minister's belief that "each legation should 
train one or more young men of manners and wealth with a view to their ultimate appointment as 
ministers."20 This view bothered his junior officers who, valuing the meritocracy through which 
they saw their own accomplishments achieved (including their own postings to Tokyo), called it 
a "horrid negation of the whole principle of the [foreign] service."21 Believing that he alone was 
capable of imparting these virtues, Marler hesitated to admit that those beneath him might have 
learned by their own skill, intelligence, or volition.22  
 Indeed, for those living or working under his authority after 1929, Marler remained a 
difficult person to please. So stilted were his views on privilege and power as a birthright that he 
could hardly sympathise with the problems facing his junior colleagues. He was by his own 
definition a 'hard worker,' and he projected this image onto the men around him as a way of 
judging their worth as well as their potential.23 The case of his son's stay in Tokyo provides a 
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 On Skelton's autonomism and the use and implementation of this ideology through External during this period, 
see Hillmer, O.D. Skelton, esp. 263, 329-35. On his fluid anti-imperialism or anti-English views, see Ibid., 11-3, 
100-1. 
20
 Keenleyside, diary entry 8 March 1929, reprinted in Hammer the Golden Day, 256-7 (Keenleyside's italics) 
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 If they are not able to "pass the competitive exams, and work up through the system" then surely they "are not 
good enough to become ministers" he exclaimed. Keenleyside, diary entry 8 March 1929, reprinted in Hammer the 
Golden Day, 257. 
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 Students, he thought, were ill equipped for the formalities of real world business and socializing. Upon first 
meeting Kenneth Kirkwood in 1929, for example, Marler gave a "little inquisition on Diplomatic Principles and 
requirement." The questions were themselves hardly unusual coming from a head of mission interviewing a new 
hire. That Kirkwood already had substantial experience in 1929, however, highlighted Marler's unwillingness to 
consider the values of a post-graduate pedigree. Kenneth Porter Kirkwood, "(Excerpt from Letter to Father) Personal 
Diary," 14 July 1929, KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC. 
23
 Evidence suggests that he expelled his first son George Leonard from the family sometime in the early thirties. 
Thereafter his father laboured to keep him as far from Montreal society as possible. These rocky relations came to a 
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characteristic example: Howard lived with his parents there for a year from 1929 to 1930. While 
there, Marler tried all he could to get him interested in the public associations and professional 
networks of Canadian, British, and American elites with which his father so readily mixed.24 
Staying in Tokyo before heading to France for his second successive year of travel, with plans to 
return to Montreal and begin his study of law at McGill, the first months of his time living under 
his father went smoothly and Marler's early letters from Tokyo reflect a certain optimism about 
his youngest son's future.25 Howard did not pass the preliminary law exams at McGill and he 
returned to Tokyo that summer on his way to Paris, his future shrouded in uncertainty. Howard's 
later disinterest and otherwise disagreeable behaviour soon exacerbated his father's patience, 
driving Marler to write his eldest daughter to complain that the twenty-two year old Howard 
"should be very much further ahead in life than he is."26 Anguish over his sons' apparent failure 
to live up to and take full advantage of the opportunities their father afforded them troubled 
Marler for the remainder of his life. After seeing Howard off from Tokyo a second time, Marler 
again confided in his adult daughter about his two sons: 
I fear very much that unless [Howard] adopts an entirely different 
attitude towards his life worked, and if he was in a position he would be 
then able to indulge every pleasure that comes along, that he will risk 
having to be written down as a serious failure. I must say it has been a 
source of the most bitter disappointment to me as to Leonard and indeed 
to a great extent as to Howard. I had looked forward so much for so 
many years to them both taking a position which, with all the advantages 
                                                                                                                                                             
head a few years later when Marler intervened in his son's attempt at a second marriage to an American woman by 
having him incarcerated on account of his mental health. Leonard sued for damages, claiming that Marler and the 
doctor conspired to diagnose him falsely in order to keep him from wedding. He dropped the case in early 1938 after 
an out of court settlement. "Plot Charged to U.S. Envoy," Berkeley Daily Gazette, 18 Oct., 1938, 11; "New Motion 
Taken in Marler Hearing," The Montreal Gazette, 15 December, 1938, 23; "Leonard Marler's Suit Against Father 
Stands," The Ottawa Citizen, 9 Dec., 1938, 1; "Leonard Marler Drops Suit Against Father," The Montreal Gazette, 
22 March, 1939, 9. These events do not appear in any subsequent literature on the family and George Leonard is not 
discussed in his brother Howard's 1987 family history, nor in the McCord Museum online exhibit about the Marler 
family compiled by Eric Marler, son of Herbert Marler's half-brother George C. Marler. Eric Marler, The Marler 
Family in Quebec by Eric Marler, M.D., Musée McCord Museum, Public Tour, accessed 15 July, 2016, 
http://www.mccord-museum.qc.ca/scripts/printtour.php?tourID=Marler&Lang=2. 
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 Marler to Adelaide, 31 October, 1929. 
25
 Marler thought it imperative that Howard learn French and he paid for his son to spend a year travelling France by 
car; "I think by doing so that I am giving him something very much more than a college degree, [. . .] because a 
perfect knowledge of French [. . .] is a wonderful thing for an English-speaking Protestant to have in Canada." 
Marler to Adelaide, 5 February 1930. 
26
 Marler to Adelaide, 4 September 1930. 
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they had, they could take. With Leonard I fear the situation is almost 
irretrievable and as to Howard I am very much afraid that the future does 
not hold the brightest prospects.27 
His lofty and unbending expectations made him a harsh critic of character, unsympathetic of the 
conditions or troubles of others. Professionally, Marler appeared to his juniors as overbearing 
and old-fashioned, a relic of a late-nineteenth century society waning in the face of technocracy 
and the specialization of experts across professions. As his management of familial matters 
demonstrates, his stringent character in the office was rather an extension of his own self than 
any managerial technique adopted to affect efficiency or quality of work. 
 Conflating his role as head of mission with these paternalistic views, in his first year 
Marler began a series of efforts to utilize the institutional structures of External, the legation, and 
the wider diplomatic practice to enhance the prestige of his junior officers. He started with a 
campaign to procure from Skelton and King promotions and raises for his staff, justifying their 
needs with not only their personal, financial reasons, but also the importance of their respective 
appearance as Canadian representatives to the Japanese capital.28 Marler assured anyone at 
External who would listen that he "could not be comfortable while [his] staff was 
uncomfortable," repeatedly offering to have his own salary reduced so that Government might 
agree to expand the legation's payroll and budget.29 Just as he thought Canadian representatives 
to Tokyo should be amply paid, so too did expect them to be suitably dressed. Marler insisted on 
wearing the gold and plumes of the British diplomats before him, extending this rule onto his 
                                                 
27
 Marler to Adelaide, 4 September 1930. Perhaps feeling guilty for criticising her younger brothers, Marler sent an 
unprompted follow-up letter to Adelaide five days later clarifying his words: "I am simply terrified that Howard may 
follow the lack of success which Leonard has pursued and that, I must admit, colours my attitude very much 
indeed." Marler to Adelaide, 9 September, 1930. 
28
 Marler made these requests across various personal letters to Skelton and King before summing them up and 
submitting them again, in their entirety, in his preface to the legation's first annual report. See Marler to King, 24 
December, 1929, RG 25 D1, Vol. 794, File 469, Department of External Affairs fonds, LAC. King wanted to keep 
salaries low, however, for reasons both political and practical. As he wrote in his diary, he did not wish to "make 
these positions social positions." W.L.M. King Diary, 5 January, 1929, MG26-J13, LAC. Marler later turned to 
precedent set in parliament, citing sections of Hansard to demand more money for his secretaries while comparing 
their pay to the men at Washington. Marler to Skelton, 30 May, 1930, RG 25, D1, Vol. 794, File 469, DEA fonds, 
LAC; Skelton to Marler, 19 June 1930, ibid. 
29
 Marler quoted in Keenleyside, Hammer the Golden Day, 283; Rice, "Sir Herbert Marler and the Canadian 
Legation in Tokyo," 77; King, writing in his diary about the decision to appoint Marler, said that "his willingness to 
use his own means to the extent of $50,000 a year, in addition to his salary shows how pleased he is to have this 
opportunity." W.L.M. King Diary, 5 January, 1929, MG26-J13, LAC. 
 54 
 
staff. As Keenleyside remembered, highlighting yet another difference in opinions between 
generations, "no one could convince Mr. Marler that [. . .] the best ornamentation was its 
avoidance."30 All this to ensure that the diplomatic corps at Tokyo – the eyes and ears of the 
world's leading powers – saw Canada in the most affluent light possible. Although his junior 
officers appreciated their minister's advocacy, the lack of a shared perception of the inward 
purpose of the legation as a means to ennoble its officers, as well as a clashing set of values 
concerning age, experience, professionalism, and various other perceived indicators of individual 
'standing,' highlighted the minister's paternal and patronising attitude toward his younger, less-
privileged staff. 
 The titles afforded to Marler by virtue of his position only added to his social and 
professional repertoire. Officially, he was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. 
Although the constant use of this full title was already anachronistic in the eyes of many – 
including Skelton – Marler went further, demanding that members of the diplomatic community 
as well as all chancellery and residence staff in Tokyo call him and his family 'their 
Excellencies.' Herbert Meredith and Beatrice Isabel Marler even adopted the practise in referring 
to one another. The two often sent memos and notices to the various members of the diplomatic 
corps to remind them of any recent occasions in which an incorrect title was used, especially 
when 'The Honourable,' or similar honorifics, were overlooked.31 Furthermore, and in a 
classically patrician sense, Marler saw to it that his titles passed among the men of the family; his 
visiting grandson, he insisted, was "His Little Excellency."32 Though not without precedent, 
Marler's interpretation and application of such formalities were somewhat uneven and often 
awkward. Earlier in the century, the British Foreign Office – the institution upon which External 
modelled itself – had slackened in its own attention to formalities. This did not last, however, 
and as the Canadian diplomatic corps was taking shape in the late interwar period, it looked to its 
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English counterpart and under the watch of certain individuals like Marler adopted this renewed 
formalism in places.33 It was not until Skelton ordered he abandon its usage that Marler relented 
with the 'excellencies.'34 
 For all his formalities and love for ceremony, Marler always operated according to and 
within the conventions of diplomatic tradition. Skelton's disapproval came as a matter of his own 
preference, not for any objective error on Marler's part. Nevertheless, many viewed his practices 
as antiquarian and unnecessary, including his junior officers at the legation. His refusal to attend 
gatherings hosted by those of lesser rank, for example, was one practice that especially 
embarrassed his fellow Canadians in Tokyo. James Manion, a commercial officer attached to the 
legation, explained that Canadian officials would often "meet the American Ambassador and 
other Heads of Mission at the homes of their most junior officers" but were "never to have our 
own Minister when we entertain them." When asked about this by his staff, Marler reasoned that 
he found it "beneath his dignity" to visit the homes of social and professional subordinates.35 
Though he sought to distance himself from them, he meanwhile laboured to cultivate the image 
and airs of even his most junior officers, managing their appearances and behaviour with his 
unbending social conservatism.36 Keenleyside noted that the Marlers were quite fond various late 
Victorian "characteristics" which, he added, "lasted so much longer in certain parts of Canada 
than they did 'back home' in sophisticated circles in the United Kingdom."37 Criticism of his love 
of ceremony and aristocratic values came not only from those subject to his authority at the 
                                                 
33
 John Tilley, British Ambassador to Japan from 1926 to 1931, notes that when he first arrived at in the Foreign 
Service as clerk in London in 1894, "it was only Ambassadors who were addressed as 'Sir' by their staffs." "We were 
not in awe of our superiors; there was no question of saying 'Sir' to an Under-Secretary […] we were all on equal 
terms." By the thirties, however, Tilley notes that the expanding bureaucratic network of the British Foreign Service 
had become far less personal; "Now," he wrote in the early 1940s, "Sirs are broadcast in all directions." Marler 
certainly attached himself to these practices and personally enforced their implementation wherever possible. Sir 
John Tilley, London to Tokyo (London: Hutchison & Co., 1942.), 22. 
34
 Keenleyside, Hammer the Golden Day, 289. 
35
 Manion, letter to his father, 27 October, 1933, reprinted in Manion, A Canadian Errant, 47-8. 
36
 One case that tested the differences of opinions and values of his staff arose when Marler refused to welcome the 
fiancée of a junior trade commission's officer within the legation building because she was a divorcee. Rather than 
simply forbid her from the premises, however, he actively opposed their marriage, allegedly doing so for the sake of 
the junior staff member's honour. Manion, A Canadian Errant, 54. 
37
 Keenleyside, Hammer the Golden Day, 286. 
 56 
 
Canadian offices, however. Several noted privately that Marler was sometimes "ridiculed by the 
other Heads of Mission" for his behaviour.38  
 Other perceptions of Marler from this period portrayed him as an unread, untraveled, 
humourless aristocrat obsessed with prestige and title.39 He published neither diaries nor memoirs 
with which to compare or defend his reputation from this period.40 Save for letters written to his 
daughter from his office in Tokyo, few traces of his private thoughts and feelings during this 
period exist.41 Despite a lack of direct insight into Marler's intimate and immediate perceptions 
during this period, it is clear that he concerned himself more with patronage and posturing than 
self-improvement or education through self-reflection. In fact, Marler valued academic education 
very little. In addition to being ignorant of world histories, one specific event symbolized his 
relationship with the humanities. Upon receiving a copy of Kirkwood's acclaimed monograph 
Turkey (co-authored with the eminent historian Arnold Toynbee) from him for Christmas, Marler 
promptly forwarded the inscribed edition to the McGill University library, appending his own 
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Diplomacy in Practice 
Marler himself saw no need to adapt or learn from his experiences in Tokyo. He made no effort 
to acclimatize to the culture or customs of local Japanese society. Instead, he retained the identity 
and outlook he had developed in Montreal through the early decades of the century, bringing to 
Tokyo his prejudices and assumptions about not only Japan, but also Canada and the Empire. On 
the various and contentious political matters facing Canadians in 1929 – immigration and social 
welfare, for example – Marler reflected little. Instead, he focused entirely on what he thought he 
knew best: trade. He did not challenge established systems of exchange between national 
representatives in the Japanese capital. Keeping himself and his work limited to the official 
diplomatic domain, he minimized his engagement with unfamiliar practices, cultures, and 
experiences. With all the privilege and means at his disposal, Marler never once had to acquiesce 
to the values of the society around him. He lived and worked in Tokyo as if in his home and 
office in downtown Montreal. Thus, Marler protected both his dignity as well as his ego, for a 
working knowledge of life in Japan was neither tested nor required. This was possible only by 
way of the autonomy afforded him as the head of his own, Canadian mission, separate from that 
of the British and answerable to no other authority in the region.  
 One of the few issues on which Marler was open to change were his views regarding 
Canadian national identity and the Dominion's autonomy in international relations. Speaking in 
the House of Commons in 1925 – before his failed campaign for re-election that October and his 
subsequent retreat from electoral politics – Marler defended his essentially conservative position 
on Dominion autonomy. Marler told his fellow MPs that, while Canada was a nation "for interior 
purposes," for "exterior purposes" Canada was not prepared and that Canadians were better 
served "minding our own business" while "assisting the British Empire" by staying out of 
"various matters abroad." "Those foreign affairs," he argued, were already in "good hands."43 
After accepting the diplomatic position in early 1929, however, his every mention of 'Canada' 
and 'England,' or 'empire' and 'autonomy' was heavily weighted with meanings now related to his 
own authority as Canada's representative to Tokyo. The imperialist-autonomist conflict thus 
became a central part of both his professional as well as private life and he quickly (and perhaps 
unsurprisingly) abandoned his opposition to Canada's participation in foreign affairs.  
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 Throughout the summer of 1929, after he had accepted his appointment as minister, and 
while en route to the Pacific from Montreal, Marler delivered speeches to Canadians across the 
country espousing the need for independent representation in order to fulfil the nation's 
responsibility as an equal member of the Commonwealth. To illustrate the purpose of his newly 
adopted position, he emphasized the structures of Commonwealth that placed Canada as 
England's equal in this union. In this new conceptualization, "the term 'equality'" he argued, "in 
no way indicates separation in foreign affairs. Quite to the contrary, it means cohesion in the way 
that no one nation of the Commonwealth, except in matters which concern her alone, can speak 
for the others or for the Commonwealth as a whole."44 He thereby justified his own title as 
Minister to Japan, securing for himself the additional personal and political autonomy afforded 
by that position. The freedoms of that job thus had the reciprocal effect of allowing him to move 
freely between his imperialist and autonomist tendencies, demonstrating the Canadian public's 
concurrent appreciations for either position.  
 Although his public statements and actions across the late-twenties revealed the glaring 
contradictions embedded in his own politics and beliefs, Marler continued on, seemingly 
unbothered by these tensions. He retained these values, adding nuance where necessary with a 
more complex view of the purported economic benefits of global free trade and, where possible, 
Imperial preference after his first year in Tokyo.45 For his new role, he reenvisioned the British 
Commonwealth of Nations as an "economic unit" and it was in these terms that he described his 
conception of Canada's place therein, thereafter measuring the effectiveness of his mission by 
economic conditions.46 Herein lies another example of Marler's – as well as Canada's – 
paradoxical and dualistic position in Japan, East Asia, and the Pacific after 1929. Once becoming 
minister, Marler deployed the Canada-as-nation position strategically, at times utilizing it to 
justify his power and position as Canadian Minister to Japan, while at other times downplaying it 
in order to gain from the established British institutions and authority in the region. Nevertheless, 
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beyond the realms of trade and commerce, he kept his views regarding global politics, 
international relations, and the validity of British Imperial claims to superiority therein, 
ambiguous. 
 Marler's fixation with trade shaped more than his abstract position regarding the 
Dominion within Empire. The project of increasing Canadian trade in East Asia became an 
obsession, guiding him in his daily operation of the legation offices. At times annoyed by his 
minister's disregard for the bigger, political picture, Keenleyside privately criticized Marler's 
"fetish about maintaining good relations for the sake of trade." He joked, for instance, that given 
the rising tensions surrounding Japan's military expansionism in Manchuria, the Canadian 
minister seemed content to "sink the League of Nations to sell a million bushels of Canadian 
wheat."47 Furthermore, in his unending search for prospective markets for the Dominion's goods, 
Marler angered Canadian Trade Commissioners already active in Japan and China. He assumed 
authority over their work, pressing them to seek his approval on reports and local budgets, 
demanding their assistance and undivided attention when touring through their cities. Marler 
apparently felt these impositions completely justifiable and indeed a part of his authority as 
Minister to Japan. Indeed, he had revealed these desires to King soon after accepting the Prime 
Minister's offer; "I believe if I have to travel in China as I think I should," he wrote from his 
offices in Montreal in January 1929, "it would increase my prestige being accredited to that 
country."48 These intentions resulted in clashes with the civil servants of the Canadian Trade 
Commissioner Service, a separate bureaucratic entity with its own hiring processes and 
hierarchies of regional authority.49 Repeatedly requesting an expanded mandate so that he could 
become minister to not only Japan, but also China, Marler never truly accepted the only real 
limits of his appointment to East Asia. 
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 His limited focus on trade also distanced him from his secretaries, as he remained aloof 
and uninvolved in their work until it came time for his signing off on their reports.50 Rather than 
adopt a heuristic, inclusive approach to his role as head of the legation – an approach which 
might have framed him as the general supervisor, equally involved in the various intelligence 
gathering projects, political reporting, or intra-ministerial dialogues underway at any given time 
– Marler delegated tasks unrelated to trade to Keenleyside and Kirkwood. These preoccupations, 
together with this rather hands-off approach to the particulars of intelligence, meant that the 
Minister was often uninformed of the complex and fluid circumstances of Japanese domestic and 
imperial politics. In the actual practice of political exchanges at Tokyo, his only desire was to 
nurture relationships he thought were conducive to the growth of Canadian trade. The task 
proved more difficult than anticipated after the onset of the Depression stagnated Canadian, and 
later Japanese, markets. Save for his promotion of trade, Kirkwood claimed, Marler had already 
done all he could in Tokyo by opening the legation and hosting introductory banquets. He was 
thus eying nothing less than an appointment to King's next Cabinet as Finance Minister, with 
ambitions to eventually become party leader and Prime Minister.51 
 
Socializing, Subordinates, and the British 
Although he kept his distance from his social and professional subordinates, amongst the most 
senior members of the Tokyo diplomatic corps Marler embraced social life, taking advantage of 
the various events held outside of the office to build relations and promote Canada and its 
exports. Socializing, as Marler saw it, was of "vast importance" as information and serious 
                                                 
50
 As British Ambassador to Japan Tilley observed during the Marler's first year in Tokyo, the Canadian legation had 
"few political questions to handle" and was instead occupied with the "furtherance of trade." Tilley, "Annual Report 
on Japan for 1929," in Political Reports 1923-1931, ed. R.L. Jarman, vol. 3 of Japan: Political and Economic 
Reports 1906-1970 (Chippenham, Wilts: Antony Rowe Ltd., 2002), 376. 
51
 As Kirkwood argued in the fall of 1929, since coming to Japan and assuming the titles and authorities afford to 
Ministers abroad, Marler had already done all he could for himself. He had already "achieved all the glory he may 
expect in this diplomatic post" Kirkwood thought. "If he returns this year, he will still have the distinction of having 
been the first Canadian Minister to Asia, of having been the first Canadian diplomat appointed by his Majesty to 
another sovereign, of having made a deep impression on the Japanese people of his urbanity and dignity, his 
aristocratic manners and lavish diplomatic establishment." Evidence of his intentions for premiership do not appear 
in any of Marler's letters and might simply be Kirkwood's hyperbolic reaction to his minister's ego and self-
confidence. It does however reflect Marler's desires for more power and authority as well as his attitude of self-
entitlement, evidently very visible to his colleagues in Tokyo. Kirkwood, "Personal Diary," 29 November 1929, 
KPK fonds, Vol. 18, File 5, LAC.  
 61 
 
discussions were inaccessible by methods more "direct." Rather than simply "going to a man's 
office," Marler explained to his friend John W. Dafoe, "[i]t is only by being friendly in a social 
way […] that once reaches some information of major importance."52 Indeed, Marler was warmly 
regarded by at least one other top-ranking foreign representative in Tokyo – Sir John Tilley 
wrote kindly of the Canadian in his memoirs, recalling warmly the farewell dinner Marler hosted 
for the British Ambassador on his departure from Japan in 1931.53 Among the most senior in 
rank at Tokyo, then, Marler was both capable and willing to consort. Meanwhile, however, he 
lived in seclusion from the Japanese public. Indeed, as one British Ambassador to Japan from 
this period noted, very few foreign representatives mixed with Japanese government officers or 
their families outside of official events.54 Because of this, Marler reflected little on the ways of 
life of the people of his host nation, urban or otherwise, relying on calls from the handful of 
English-speaking officials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make his judgements 
about a Japanese national character or characteristic manner. This disconnect (and general 
ignorance), however, did not limit his confidence when speaking of Japanese society, culture, or 
politics. In Japan, as in Canada, Marler did little to hide his racist views of the inferior Japanese 
and 'Oriental' peoples, a view which matched well with his paternalism and self-serving 
interpretation of a noblesse oblige. No doubt a product of his time, this reflected his own racist 
views of his host nation, its cultures, and its inhabitants.55 Canadians in Tokyo, he proudly 
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explained, were prepared to "cultivate the people of Japan."56 About what precisely this entailed, 
and to which Canadians this task fell, Marler remained characteristically ambiguous. 
 Certainly, Marler was aware of the implications of opening a Canadian mission in a 
foreign capital already served by a British ambassador. He also realized the uniqueness of the 
circumstances at Tokyo. Reporting to Mackenzie King on his arrival in Tokyo, Marler 
emphasized that his mission was "entering into an entirely new field of activities" in East Asia, 
with "factors totally different" from those facing the Washington and Paris legations. 
Nevertheless, with the British ambassadorial staff already well established in the Japanese capital, 
Marler recognized the need to "proceed cautiously" while not interfering to avoid even the 
"slightest embarrassment."57 Given his personal history of imperialist leanings, Marler had no 
trouble indulging British authorities there, and his reports that there were no major rifts between 
the separate missions in the first three years were genuine. One British Ambassador remembered 
Marler to have been "entirely loyal," never showing "any desire to separate his interests from 
ours."58 His paradoxical character thus proved useful as it helped smooth relations between an 
institution breaking new ground in Dominion autonomy and that of the established, imperial 
'homeland.' To his Prime Minister, Marler insisted that his "whole objective" in Tokyo was to 
promote "co-operation [. . .] between Canada and Great Britain and vice versa," while "indicating 
the complete independence of Canada in her own affairs."59 In the meantime, however, Marler 
struggled to impress upon his Japanese hosts the separateness of the Canadian and British nations. 
Demonstrating this division of authority while maintaining a balance and cordial relations with 
the resident British diplomatic staff weighed heavily over Marler's every action. He proved, 
however, an amicable and willing candidate to balance these polarizing and politically charged 
manoeuvrings.60 
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 However sceptical of Canada's status or capabilities in global politics British 
representatives to Tokyo were, they offered no official opposition to Marler's integration into the 
diplomatic corps there. In fact, Marler boasted that his introductory address to the Tokyo 
diplomatic corps – in which he stressed that his legation was "an entirely separate entity from the 
British Embassy," that Canada was an equal members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 
and that he expected to be consulted on all matters pertaining to the greater British Empire – was 
met by British Ambassador Tilley's resounding approval.61 Although Marler at times adopted the 
British policy or position on sensitive matters in East Asia, leading more than once to 
disagreements amongst legation staff and clashes with Skelton and King in Ottawa, he adamantly 
represented his own, separate nation in all official appearances as minister.62 Nevertheless, he 
was left wanting a stronger endorsement from the British officials, however, and lamented that 
through his years in Tokyo the English never once acted to promote the "prestige" of the 
Canadians. He busied himself with gathering up as many memberships and public positions as 
his British counterpart, publicly protesting any resistance he faced while doing so. At Tokyo, he 
told King, he had improved Canada's prestige – though he had to "fight for it" as the British 
officials there were unwilling to provide any assistance or generosity toward their Canadian 
neighbours. They "tolerated the Canadian legation," but did not go out of their way to assist it. 
For this reason, Marler argued that all Canadian accomplishments in Tokyo were the product of 
"unaided" efforts by Canadians and for Canadians.63 
 
A National Image, Reconsidered(?) 
More than anyone involved in Tokyo, Marler worked incessantly to promote the legation and 
Canada in the press. This he began with his Canadian speaking tour. Afterwards, he drafted 
many press releases, beginning with one he delivered at the docks of Yokohama upon his arrival. 
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He provided many more to the English-language papers in Japan (of which there were as many 
as three in concurrent publication between 1929 and 1933), meanwhile maintaining an open line 
of communication with the Canadian media. A friendly relationship with John Dafoe, editor of 
the Manitoba Free Press and ardent Canadian nationalist, provided Marler with a sympathetic 
ear as well as a platform from which to promote the work and image of the Tokyo legation back 
in Canada.64 The two exchanged lengthy personal letters, orchestrating the newspaper's special 
coverage of the Canadians' work in East Asia, meanwhile giving Dafoe's paper a leg up on 
competitors who relied on Ottawa and External for their stories. Dafoe used the legation to 
demonstrate and celebrate the work of the Canadian government abroad.65 Marler accepted this 
praise, taking the chance to demonstrate to his critics in Canada that his job was more than a 
simple "joy-ride," as some claimed.66  
 In 1931, Marler negotiated the inclusion of works by Canadian painters in an exhibition 
organized by the new British Ambassador Francis Lindley. On the Canadian minister's 
suggestion, Lindley added another, separate room where the Canadian Minister displayed fifteen 
pieces from those on loan to the legation by the Canadian National Gallery, as well as number 
from his own private collection. While Marler's reactions to the event remain unclear, Lindley 
admitted to the Foreign Office in London "though the exhibition contained examples of the work 
of some good artists," it was not "worthy of all the expense incurred."67 Popular response was 
positive, however. Canadian Second Secretary Kenneth Kirkwood reported in the local English 
language press and in private that the Canadian pieces – all of which were of landscapes, 
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including several Group of Seven works – communicated the geographical diversity of the 
Dominion to its audience, demonstrating a "complete break with European conditions" in both 
subject and composition. The Canadian art displayed was "characterized by an adoption, to some 
degree, of European standards" but thereafter strengthened for their adoption of "more 
indigenous" influences in the New World, providing a sharp contrast with the portraiture works 
that filled the remainder of the British exhibition, he said.68 Audiences were thus treated with yet 
another new perspective on Canadian identity and culture, this time in the form of a visual, 
material culture presented alongside symbols of the very national-imperial entity from which the 
Canadians at Tokyo laboured to present themselves as distinct. 
 The projection of image – both his individual image, as well as a purportedly collective, 
national image – was so important to Marler that on numerous occasions he spent private funds 
to promote it. In this way, he performed the role of patrician representative of culture and 
authority much as he had in Montreal. Indeed, his reputation for spending private funds while a 
public, government figure had followed him from the Quebec metropolis to the Japanese capital. 
Critics of his appointment to Tokyo remembered his 1921 campaign for election to Parliament, 
in which he had been accused of spending $75,000 to ensure his victory. As Keenleyside argued, 
on hearing this rumour from a previous electoral opponent of Marler's, "this, in those days, was 
an enormous sum, and the charge was almost like accusing Mr. Marler of corruption." When he 
asked Marler about this episode privately, the minister replied that the sum had more likely been 
$100,000.69 Later, during the 1925 election, his subsequent Conservative opponent claimed to 
have capitalized on Marler's unabashed and unsympathetic tendencies to flaunt his wealth; MP 
Charles Cahan charged that Marler publicly touted his own social position to his electorate in 
appealing for their votes.70 In Tokyo, however, such practices went over comparatively well with 
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the diplomatic elite. Moreover, he no longer needed the confidence of his Montreal electorate. 
He benefitted from both his spending and from his celebration of social standing, personally 
organizing and financing a number of projects aimed at promoting a prosperous image of Canada 
in Japan. Whenever External refused his budgets for these purchases, Marler paid with his own 
funds.71 This included the construction of a new legation building, a project he supervised until 
its completion in 1933, thereafter furnishing it with the finest and most expensive furniture and 
decorations. His obsession with appearances went further, however, as the Minister insisted on 
wearing the gaudiest of Windsor uniform, complete with plumed hat and sabre.72 He saw his 
prestige as Minister as the most important tool he had in a Japanese society he deemed obsessed 
with the presentation and maintenance of 'face. As the loss of 'face' meant the loss of one's 
position in society, Marler insisted that the "prestige of the Canadian Legation," together with 
that of its Minister, "be acknowledged in every particular."73 
 
Self Interest in the National Interest: Conclusion 
Marler's ideas regarding Canada's place in the empire remained unchallenged for much of his 
early life in Montreal and Ottawa. In Tokyo, however, an internal conflict pertaining to his 
negotiation of seemingly conflicting identities and interests is evident. As Minister to Japan, he 
had to negotiate and discern Canada's role and position relative to England and empire from 
within an institution whose very existence challenged Britain's claims to authority over its 
dominions. Thus, while his professional performance as Minister to Japan was important in 
terms of establishing Canada's place and purpose in Pacific as well as global, international 
politics and exchange, it simultaneously demonstrates how the individual influenced structural 
developments in international politics and relations. Furthermore, as recent studies of the 
international as well as domestic political implications of Marler's actions at Tokyo have 
similarly shown, his paradoxical character and loyalties reflected more than just one individual's 
identity.74 He personified the imperialist-autonomist dichotomy amongst Canadian policy-
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shapers during this time while simultaneously demonstrating that, from 1929 to 1933 at least, 
these ideologies could and did coexist in Canadian political circles and even within an otherwise 
autonomist institution such as the Department of External Affairs and its Tokyo legation. 
Marler's personal conflicts of identity, together with his perhaps inadvertent attempts to reconcile 
them, highlight the cleavages then prevalent within ascendant, interwar Canadian society. 
Importantly, though, it was his ability to extend his privilege and authority beyond the local and 
onto the global stage of interwar diplomacy that kept him from succumbing to forces challenging 
patrician elites in Canada.75 By oscillating between bouts of autonomist nationalism and loyalist 
imperialism in order to protect his own position, Marler was able to prolong his relevancy and, 
with the titles and accolades afforded him after 1929, pad his accumulated privilege one final 
time. 
 In his survey of modern diplomacy, Jeremy Black writes of Sir Nevile Bland's 1956 
account of the practises of international relations. Black highlights Bland's defence of tradition 
and 'proper' diplomacy, recorded as a preface to Ernest Satow's seminal A Guide to Diplomatic 
Practice, to demonstrate how Hitler and the war had affected the diplomatic conduct by the mid-
century, and how men like Bland (and Marler) – diplomacy's 'old guard' – were then left to watch 
bitterly from the outside. Like Marler, Bland had been a foreign minister for his King and 
country in the interwar period, similarly earning a title as Knight Commander of the Order of St 
Michael and St George (KCMG) in its second decade.76 Living through the war to write about 
the halcyon days of diplomacy, Bland lamented the head of mission's loss of autonomy in daily 
operations. "Increasing questioning and criticism in parliament and the press; a growing 
tendency for ministers dealing with foreign affairs to travel about the world and take into their 
own hands consolations which a few decades back could, and would, have been conducted by 
the heads of the diplomatic missions concerned" had, in Bland's understanding, undermined the 
"confidence and independence of members of the Foreign Service."77 Herbert Meredith Marler 
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utilized this very same autonomy to capitalize not only on the few privileges that were not 
available to him in Montreal – namely, international prestige – but also to sustain his social and 
political relevance in the face of a changing urban Canadian mainstream.78  
 Yet Marler paid little notice to the waning influence of patricians such as himself – even 
as junior officers all around him made their daily notes and comments to that effect. Even his son 
longed for his father's society a half-century after the Second World War had snatched his 
patrician inheritances away from him, highlighting how those turn of the century structures 
underpinned patrician heads of families' claims to authority. Marler's experiences were thus 
limited to, and contained within, the period and society that made room for and accommodated 
his individual privilege and authority. Just as he ignored the views of those beneath him, so too 
did he ignore the signs of a coming change. Meanwhile, he utilized the political developments in 
both Canada and the greater Empire in the 1920s, as well as a comparatively simple, liberal 
nationalist version of constitutional history to justify the authority, status, and title afforded him 
as Minister to Japan.79 Thereafter, however, his greatest contributions to Canadian distinctiveness 
and autonomy abroad came not in the form of political action or discourse. Instead, they came 
from the visual and material representations of Canadian culture and identity his person and 
work in Tokyo represented. 
 In light of the contrasting and parallel experiences of his fellow Canadians and members 
of the diplomatic corps in Tokyo, Marler's individual experience, as well as the various external 
perceptions of it, point to important turning points in three concurrent but separate histories. His 
arrival in Tokyo as first Canadian Minister to Japan in 1929 represented the reification of 
Dominion autonomy in international diplomacy. His quick and seamless transition from public 
life in Montreal to the elite, diplomatic circles of Tokyo meanwhile exemplify the twilight years 
of high diplomacy as practiced (albeit in slightly revised forms) since the Congress of Vienna. 
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Finally, Marler's reluctance to embrace change in social and political spheres in Canada – those 
he once dominated unchallenged – marked the final abdication of the patrician from the heights 




Chapter 3 – Kenneth Porter Kirkwood: The Inquisitive Adventurer 
The longest serving Canadian diplomat to Tokyo during the interwar period was Kenneth Porter 
Kirkwood who worked there as its most junior diplomatic secretary from 1929 to 1939. 
Unmarried and without children for the duration of his time in Japan, Kirkwood enjoyed the 
greatest amount of personal independence of the three legation men examined here. Unlike 
Keenleyside and Marler, Kirkwood was motivated less by the national policies of Canada or the 
position of the Dominion within empire and amongst the world's powers. Instead, he navigated 
his experiences in the office, ballroom, and wherever else possible, by the direction of his 
individual interests, passions, and desires. In his life and work in the Japanese capital, I will 
argue that Kirkwood saw himself as more of a contemplative adventurer than a national 
representative. To Kirkwood, diplomacy was an avenue for research and for intercultural 
exchange. He saw foreign policy as the work of officials and politicians in Ottawa who, using 
information provided by diplomats like himself, were responsible for its creation and deployment. 
The partisan politics shaping Canadian-Japanese relations were beyond his personal influence 
and interest. Kirkwood was not, however, without opinions regarding the structures of authority 
upon which this system operated. In fact, he rooted his understanding of Canada's place in 
international politics in a deep appreciation for the British Crown and Empire.1 It was through 
the lens of Empire that he understood all aspects of international and cross-cultural, global 
exchange. While this appreciation for empire informed many of Kirkwood's actions and 
decisions throughout this period, he kept his politics private. The views he so often expressed in 
his diaries and essays thus remained hidden from his colleagues and acquaintances, left unspoken 
throughout his tenure as a Canadian national representative to Tokyo.  
 Kirkwood utilized the independence he found while in Japan primarily to make time to 
write. In the first three years of his posting there, he diligently recorded his thoughts and 
experiences about diplomacy, the world, Canadian and Japanese societies and cultures, and his 
individual role and responsibilities. He reflected, in his diaries and letters, upon his role and 
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experience as a diplomat, citizen, and imperial subject while deconstructing the various 
international exchanges his work facilitated. The written record he left illuminates how often 
these exchanges occurred on the periphery of official, bi-lateral, or multi-lateral national 
discussions. As such, they demonstrate both the personal and political freedoms the men of 
External in East Asia enjoyed during the twilight years of interpersonal, high diplomacy, as well 
as the actual influence of these individuals. Despite his reluctance to admit to any personal 
influence on Japanese-Canadian relations, his papers demonstrate how imperative the individual 
was to the cultivation and maintenance of international ties. His writing from this period was 
often broadly anthropological. Kirkwood compiled numerous essays about society and culture 
around him, as he saw and understood it. Much more of his writing followed an inward and 
reflexive gaze onto the self. While discovering and asserting his ability to devote time to 
contemplate and write in Tokyo, the individual experience supplanted his prescribed professional 
objectives as the most valuable aspect of Kirkwood's life in East Asia. 
 Adapting to life and work in Tokyo, Kirkwood was determined to spread his time across 
his public and private lives, thus differentiating himself from the obsessive careerism of his 
minister, Herbert Marler, and the comparatively family-orientated first secretary, Hugh 
Keenleyside. Unlike his two superiors in Tokyo, Kirkwood did not take the position for reasons 
of professional advancement. Although the salary and future opportunities it afforded were 
enticing, Kirkwood appreciated the position for more personal and immediately pragmatic 
reasons. These pertained to a two-part desire, first to escape the doldrums of southern Ontario (as 
he saw life there in the late-1920s); and second, to return to the foreign and exciting 'orient' 
which he had visited as a graduate student.2 Thus, relative to his colleagues in Tokyo, Kirkwood 
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saw himself as more of a contemplative adventurer than a vessel of political authority or reform. 
Contented with the structures of the Empire he so loved, Kirkwood valued the chance to explore 
the frontiers of Western modernity and authority. Consequently, his papers from this period 
reflect matters of Canadian and international politics far less than those of his two senior 
colleagues in Tokyo. Instead, Kirkwood's writings relate the broader and more diverse set of 
experiences of a man who travelled to Japan to be a noble, self-styled example of liberal, 
democratic modernity amongst ancient and foreign peoples. To make sense of and record for 
posterity what he witnessed there, Kirkwood turned to the English Romantics and explorers of 




Kenneth Porter Kirkwood was born April 14, 1899, in Brampton Ontario. The Kirkwood 
family's southern Ontario roots stretched back to when his great-grandfather arrived from 
Scotland in the late eighteenth century.4 Shortly after Kirkwood's birth, the family moved to 
Cleveland, Toronto, and then London, England. Writing in the preface to her late husband's 
memoirs, Christine Kirkwood explains that he received his primary education from "various 
private and county schools in and around London until the age of eleven," after which his family 
returned to Canada.5 Kirkwood developed his lifelong penchant for writing as a child. At nine, he 
won a national essay contest in Britain, meanwhile publishing short stories in his school's 
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bulletin.6 Graduating from high school in Ontario during the First World War, he enlisted in the 
army and completed training as an infantry lieutenant in Toronto before switching to the Royal 
Naval Air Service. He served as a pilot in France and the Mediterranean, while continuing to 
write essays and poems.7 Decades later in Tokyo, Kirkwood explained how the experiences of 
living in London as a boy and serving "for the sake of England" in the First World War instilled 
in him an appreciation for the British crown as an "institution" that, as the "node of the 
Commonwealth," represented the "greatest fact of modern political history."8 
 Like all of the diplomatic secretaries hired under Oscar Skelton at External in the late 
twenties, Kirkwood had a long list of academic achievements to his name. He began his post-
secondary education at Victoria College of the University of Toronto, graduating there in 
Political Science. At Toronto, Kirkwood attended the debates and conferences of the Student 
Christian Movement, a liberal theological and political discussion group.9 This organization 
afforded him numerous opportunities and it was here that he met Maryon Moody.10 The two 
became close and remained in frequent contact following Kirkwood's graduation and subsequent 
reading year in England and Scotland.11 However, in 1923, toward the end of Kirkwood's stay in 
the British Isles, Maryon began her courtship with a young professor at Toronto named Lester B. 
Pearson. The couple were quickly engaged and Kirkwood ceased regular correspondence with 
the soon to be Maryon Pearson.12 While Kirkwood knew 'Mike' Pearson from the circles at 
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Toronto, relations between the two remained reticent.13 The Pearson wedding marked the end of 
one personal relationship, and the beginning of another much longer, professional one for 
Kirkwood. In the decades that followed, as he distanced himself from Maryon, Kirkwood was 
increasingly subsumed under Pearson's professional and political authority.  
 Indeed, Kirkwood neglected and lost a number of relationships during his early life. The 
rupture between him and Maryon was only the most recent event making southern Ontario an 
uncomfortable location for him in the mid-twenties.14 Furthermore, as his personal essays and 
diaries demonstrate, making friends remained a challenge throughout this period.15 Thus, the lure 
of a life abroad became ever more enticing to a man who, entering the elite professional 
workforce as a well travelled and educated bachelor, sought an escape from pressures to settle 
down in either sleepy Ottawa or the growing, though nevertheless still socially 'small,' Toronto. 
Utilizing his background in 'Near-Eastern' history, Kirkwood took a teaching job at an 
international college in Smyrna (now İzmir), Turkey. He translated this experience into an 
opportunity to conduct research on the side. In 1926 he co-authored his first book, Turkey, under 
the guidance of his friend and mentor, historian Arnold J. Toynbee.16 Kirkwood's academic as 
well as personal experience engaging 'the orient' continually afforded him opportunities in life. 
Colleagues and employers thereafter knew him as an expert or specialist on this expansive region 
– an important distinction in this moment of academic and public service professionalization.17 
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That fall he took a lectureship position at Columbia University, continuing his graduate studies 
there in the meantime. 
 
Re-imagining a Modern World 
Kirkwood lived in the prestigious International House while in New York, sharing a building 
with a number of the men and women with whom he would cross paths as a career diplomat.18 
International House residents in the mid-twenties were beneficiaries of earlier shifts amongst 
leading intellectuals and elite professionals who sought alternatives to the destructive 
nationalisms they perceived as responsible for the First World War. These answers, they thought, 
lay in the promotion of global co-operation through networks of international education and 
exchange. In the graduate studies departments of Columbia, these efforts culminated in the 
invitation of a growing number of international faculty and students. As historian Liping Bu 
argues, the elite, American purveyors of this internationalism – individuals who backed such 
institutions as Columbia and International House – saw themselves as tutors to a caste of future 
liberal democratic leaders in the rebuilding Europe and its modernizing, colonial periphery. 
Kirkwood assimilated these views, taking on what he later described as the "responsibility of my 
generation of students for future leadership."19 The opening of International House New York in 
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1924 "characterized the internationalist endeavour of the cultural elite" who, Bu explains, 
gleefully imbibed the liberal optimism of the 1920s while celebrating the religious, linguistic, 
cultural, and ethnic diversity of its residents.20  
 Explaining the ideals prevalent amongst student organizations at Columbia and elsewhere 
in the early 1920s Kirkwood wrote: "there was an inspiration in all this post-war participation in 
attempting to rebuilding [sic] a better world and extend the ideals of international brotherhood."21 
The philosophy of international exchange and experience upon which American philanthropists 
built International House matched well with Kirkwood's outlook. His time there strengthened his 
faith in the power of international exchange and friendship as a way to combat what others saw 
as naturalized, ethnic or racial differences. Privately, Kirkwood expressed his sense of racial 
superiority.22 The global brotherhood was to be cast in a mould of liberal democracy and led by 
the 'Anglo-Saxon' peoples so experienced in its forms of governance. Those privileged enough to 
live International House while attending Columbia in the mid-twenties were educated in these 
Anglo-Saxonist, liberal democratic terms. Their brand of internationalism took the democratic 
nation-state as central actor in a world of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation.23 Through the 
sequential upheavals of the 1930s, Kirkwood's generation of international (and internationalist) 
graduate students retained these perspectives to varying degrees, while the tides of racial 
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prejudice and nationalist fervour continued to rise around them.24 Later, in the wake of the Great 
Depression, the very same forces of racism and nationalism America's elite philanthropists 
envisioned Kirkwood's class combating met with waves of austerity, stifling internationalist 
education movements of this type and dealing a fatal blow to institutions such as International 
House.25 This tension between the apparent universalism of this portion of global elite and the 
narrowly defined nationalisms then proliferating across regions of the world troubled Kirkwood 
throughout the early portions of his foreign service career. In the mid-century, he was somewhat 
unknowingly witness to the sowing of the seeds of resistance against the very liberal democratic 
framework his colleagues and educators regarded so dearly. Emerging across the growing 
number of post-colonial contexts within which this framework had been imposed upon its 
subjects, these movements clashed spectacularly with the institutions and structures of authority 
that had so privileged Kirkwood in his interwar life and career.  
 
Professional Crossroads 
In 1928, faced with the chance to complete his PhD and begin a career in academia, Kirkwood 
wrote and passed examinations for two new positions at Canada's Department of External Affairs. 
He skipped over questions on Political Science and Political Economy at each opportunity, 
opting instead for those in International Law, his most recent field at Columbia, as well as 
Modern History.26 Meanwhile, his candidacy was further benefitted by Skelton's weighting of the 
professional and academic experience of applicants, part of the Under Secretary's campaign to 
attract and recruit internationally educated candidates in addition to the usual professional elite. 
Worth even more than the exam questions, Kirkwood's ninety per cent score in "Education & 
Experience" insured him top rank amongst the sixty others who wrote.27 In a 'graduating class' of 
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eight hires that included Lester Pearson, Hugh Keenleyside, and Norman Robertson, Kirkwood 
ranked second for both positions he applied for.28  
 Kirkwood's first posting was under Canada's first Minister to Washington D.C., Vincent 
Massey.29 Massey gave Kirkwood his earliest lessons on diplomatic etiquette and lifestyle. "In 
the diplomatic career you are on duty 24 hours a day" Massey told his newest secretary, "there is 
no interlude when you can forget your role, rank and representational character, and become a 
private individual."30 In the years that followed, Kirkwood reflected on the nature and practise of 
diplomacy in these terms – though, as he later realized, Massey's notion of diplomacy was not its 
only possible interpretation. The social circuit of Washington D.C. in 1928 was Kirkwood's trial 
by fire. There he learned the ins and outs of the interpersonal 'extras' by which diplomacy was 
then so often conducted: the luncheon, the dinner party, and the ball.31 Working abroad for the 
first time, alongside the enduringly condescending Hume Wrong, Kirkwood's earliest days at 
External were trying ones.  
 After 1928, any desire Kirkwood had to return to Ottawa was limited to concerns about 
his career. To be away from External's head offices often meant falling out of contention for 
promotions and accolades. Nevertheless, Kirkwood remained adverse to the idea of living in the 
capital. "Ottawa is a city that has attractions for those who have roots there, or who have friends 
or a social niche," he wrote to himself. "[U]nless one is intimately associated with those circles, 
it possesses few stimulating advantages."32 Returning from his yearlong posting at Washington to 
Ottawa, the Canadian capital's "small town manner and small town code of morality" was jarring. 
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No longer able to see the "movies and plays that millions of people enjoyed in other cities," and 
with only a few "insignificant restaurants," Kirkwood found himself bored. With wines and 
spirits in short supply, he regularly crossed with friends into nearby Hull, Quebec to imbibe.33 
Again, the incongruity of his personal and professional desires troubled him.34 Meanwhile, 
however, his practical experience abroad made him the most certified secretary in 1929 without a 
post. Soon after his arrival in Ottawa, Skelton proposed his addition to the staff of the Legation 
in Tokyo, scheduling his September arrival in East Asia.  
 Privately, Kirkwood admitted to having his heart "set on a European post, and a chance to 
see family at home."35 He wished for a return to the cuisine, culture, and familiarity of Europe, a 
place that had supplanted the town and province where he was born as 'home.' Keenleyside had 
only five weeks earlier opened the Tokyo offices when, on 8 July, 1929, Kirkwood accepted the 
posting.36 He met with Marler in Montreal before their August sailing from Vancouver to 
Yokohama on the Canadian Pacific Railway steamer, the Empress of France.  
 Upon arrival in Tokyo, Kirkwood became third secretary. This was a demotion in rank 
relative to his previous two assignments at Ottawa and Washington. Kirkwood's acceptance of 
these conditions – the reduction in rank and the posting to a non-European capital – 
demonstrated his persistent desire to experience life outside of Ottawa.37 As Skelton would not 
approve Marler's requests for an additional hiring, Kirkwood's role became that of the minister's 
assistant.38 Meanwhile, Kirkwood admitted to his father that his status as a childless bachelor 
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made him a "cheaper" option for Skelton and the Department. He was self-conscious of how he 
had been "foisted upon [Marler], rammed down his throat so to speak, by the High Command" 
who decided that he was, on his own, a better option as at once a junior officer and personal 
assistant to Marler than the hiring of another, junior staff member.39 In just his first six months on 
the job, this self-consciousness turned to bitterness as he reflected upon the very nature of his 
role, as well as the overall productivity of the legation. Meanwhile, however, he benefitted from 
his minister's desire for institutional prestige. By the end of the spring of 1930, with the help of 
Marler's many letters to Ottawa, Kirkwood returned to the rank of second secretary.40 
Nevertheless, he found himself worked to the point of exhaustion tending to Marler's social 
calendar and he remained unable to pinpoint the greater purpose of his various duties. He battled 
loneliness as a sense of alienation from the local Japanese and foreign populations Tokyo set in. 
 Although Kirkwood remained unwavering in his duties as a civil servant, his private 
papers from this period reflect a continuing tendency to question the circumstances and 
conditions that had brought him to East Asia. "I sometimes wonder what a Canadian Legation 
can accomplish in Japan," Kirkwood wrote, admitting that while "Mr. Marler is definitely 
anxious to 'drum up business,'" he wondered whether "this should rather be the work of trade 
commissioners than the function of an ambassador."41 With their daily filling of mailbags, 
attendance to the nightly events of the diplomatic corps, and their various speeches on Canada's 
place in the Empire, the Pacific, and the maintenance of amicable bi-lateral relations therein, he 
was bothered by his belief that though the Canadians in Tokyo were thoroughly busy, the 
legation was producing no new policy. Kirkwood thus found little inspiration in his work. From 
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his perspective, the legation was hardly promoting a 'greater good' or engaging in the active 
improvement of the lives of those it encountered. 
 
The Individual and His Society 
In private, Kirkwood described the early objectives of the legation in rather solemn terms. 
"Unlike our European missions, which are largely concerned with encouraging immigration," he 
explained to his father, "our Japanese Legation must be concerned with discouraging 
immigration, with all the tact and diplomacy at our command."42 He had only an indirect role in 
these early tasks, the centerpiece of which was the renewal of the "Gentleman's Agreement on 
Immigration." Still acting personal assistant to the minister, Kirkwood facilitated the meetings 
and banquets at which Marler and Keenleyside, together with their counterparts from the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducted the necessary discussions. 
 Kirkwood was thirty years old and unmarried when he arrived in Tokyo.43 During his first 
years there, the many comments and questions he received on this matter caused him some 
distress.44 Adding to his colleagues' and friends' interest, Kirkwood avoided wedding ceremonies, 
skipping the celebrations of even the most politically and socially important couples. In private, 
he prepared arguments in defence of his unmarried status.45 Though he repeatedly resisted the 
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44
 He wrote long and often on the subject, including essays titled "On Being a Bachelor," "Bachelordom," and 
"Bachelor Musings."All in KPK fonds, LAC. Often, his explanations as to his unmarried status centered around the 
apparently innate complexity of his character, the sensitivities of his heart, and the inevitable inabilities of women to 
understand or match his features and passions. Moreover, it was during this period that he was in the midst of a case 
of unrequited love involving New York socialite and former fellow student at Columbia University, Louise Hawkes. 
Louise was the daughter of the prominent social conservative Republican senator for New Jersey, Albert Hawkes, 
and was in her later life a hardliner anti-communist and opponent of liberal education reform. She was wed in 1932, 
becoming Mrs. Louise Padelford, dealing a seemingly fatal blow to Kirkwood's faith in monogamy, love, and the 
institution of marriage. On Kirkwood and Hawkes' rather one sided relationship, see: "Hawkes, Louise R. 
Correspondence," Vol. 27, File 12, KPK fonds, LAC. A collection of essays, poems, and autobiographical 
reflections about the experience are found bound and ordered by Kirkwood himself in "Hawkes, Louise R. Intimate 
Reflections by K.P.K.," Vol. 27, File 13, in Ibid. On the life and later conservative political activism of Louise, see: 
Michael E. James, The Conspiracy of the Good: Civil Rights and the Struggle for Community in Two American 
Cities, 1875-2000 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005), 258-274; Andrew Hartman, "Progressive Education is 
Red-ucation: Conservative Though and Cold War Educational Vigilantism," chapter 5 in Hartman's Education and 
the Cold War: The Battle for the American School (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008): 91-116. 
45
 He cited the economic dangers of marrying young, when a man is still in the midst of his "scramble for 
professional success and achievement;" and that a lifelong commitment requires a certain "spiritual affinity" which 
 82 
 
expectations placed upon him as an elite, Anglophone male – pressures to start a family after 
university in Ontario, for example – Kirkwood's resistance was not founded in opposition to such 
values. He in no way sought to change or even oppose his society's values; he praised and 
respected (at times, even envied) his male colleagues who had married. Rather, he valued his 
own personal autonomy in deciding when and how these moments would occur in his own life. 
During this period, it was this personal autonomy that he cherished most. This level of self-
involvement, free from desires to change the status quo, led him to adopt practises of intense 
self-reflection and the cultivation of a specific personal image and history. Realizing this at the 
start of his second year in Tokyo, Kirkwood began a wholehearted engagement – obsession, even 
– with his mind, philosophy, and personal experiences. 
 From 1930, Kirkwood asserted a more formal division between home and work, thereby 
relieving himself of the triviality of the office duties he found so inconsequential.46 His 
management of this division demonstrated a form of personal autonomy which he used to create 
a private sphere where there was once only a public, professional one. He first did this by renting 
and establishing a home some distance away from the legation.47 Then, within this new space, he 
built relationships with a number of Westerners who, arriving on private business, offered a way 
to expand and enliven a life outside diplomatic circles. Furthermore, in his first year in Japan, 
Kirkwood took advantage of the reduced summer office hours to expand this personal sphere by 
spending the season at Lake Chūzenji and at Karuizawa, mountain villages that offered the 
privileged foreign residents of Tokyo reprieve from the oppressive heat of the coastal summers.  
 The prestige and connections afforded by his diplomatic status, as well as his growing 
connections amongst the local elite, allowed Kirkwood to reap the benefits of the collective 
social institutions of the diplomatic corps and foreign community of Tokyo. He navigated these 
circles in order to circumvent Vincent Massey's rule that as diplomats were "on duty 24 hours a 
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day" they were inherently unable to "become a private individual."48 For all the stasis being in 
Tokyo brought to the progression of his career, to be so removed from the scrutinizing gazes of 
Skelton, the Prime Minister, the variously imperialist and autonomist MPs and journalists 
brought a level of personal freedom and autonomy in action unmatched amongst Canadian 
diplomats elsewhere. Importantly, it was only after he had established for himself a private, 
home sphere and life for himself in Tokyo that his creative productivity and happiness returned. 
It was amongst these private hobbies and passions – the most important of which was writing – 
that Kirkwood found his purpose in Tokyo. 
 Kirkwood was in fact aware of the ancillary opportunities and privileges afforded by the 
position in Tokyo when he took the job. While in Ottawa, he rationalized his decision to his 
father, citing the freedom and exploration the post would allow. Kirkwood explained that while 
he accepted "the appointment like a soldier ordered off for foreign service," the chance to make 
the trans-Canadian trip by rail, to reside in the "Far East under the most favourable 
circumstances of prestige and position," and to have audience with the Emperor of Japan helped 
to ease his longing for a European post.49 The office work at the legation was a small price to pay 
for these privileges. In his second year in Tokyo, Kirkwood realized these opportunities by 
asserting his personal autonomy, taking advantage of urban life in Tokyo while seeking out the 
imported high, western culture he so craved. 
 For members of the late-interwar foreign diplomatic corps in Tokyo, official social 
engagements demanding attendance were held on a near nightly basis. In this capacity, 
Kirkwood was an active, if reluctant, socialite. While some Canadians embraced this aspect of 
interwar diplomacy – his former and current ministers in the early 1930s Vincent Massey and 
Herbert Marler, for example – Kirkwood's preference for quiet seclusion amongst books proved 
a challenge as the seemingly endless stream of invitations and obligations rolled in. As one of the 
central reasons behind the legation's opening was to promote and project Canada's name, image, 
and autonomy onto the world stage, these social events represented invaluable opportunities for 
Marler and his staff. For those aligned with Skelton's outright autonomism, they were chances to 
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make headway in distinguishing the Dominion from its Imperial motherland. For others, they 
were further chances to sell Canadian wheat. For Kirkwood, however, these events were nothing 
more than compulsory showcases of the collective roles of the diplomatic corps, all conducted 
with a polite and polished hollowness he found unfulfilling. 
 As the central venue of exchange between national representatives, the luncheon, dinner 
party, and reception were important to the life and work of those whose purpose it was to ensure 
that discussions among national governments remained cordial and constant.50 Kirkwood's 
recorded experiences reflect this fact. Despite the apparent importance of the "social side of 
diplomatic life" however, Kirkwood confided that it did not appeal to him: "It thoroughly bores 
me," he wrote, 
it is all so farcical and vapid and vain. I have no innate relish for the 
social masquerade, or any high and exciting regard for respect for the 
high person of high place whom one perfunctorily meets in the 
diplomatic round. All of them are empty of stimulating enthusiasms or 
thoughts, all of them wear the same benevolent but meaningless mask 
and say little of what their think or feel; all of them, perhaps, are equally 
envious of the simple man in the street who is free to live and love to 
think and act without always keeping to the inhibiting and restricting 
vacuousness and fatuousness of form.51 
At these events, as with the private outings he increasingly took part in after 1930, Kirkwood's 
companions were always foreign. He had few personal relationships with Japanese citizens 
outside of those he employed as servants or guides.52  
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 His limited contact with native residents of Tokyo and its surrounding areas was no doubt 
result of the difficulties of communication, but there was also the matter of differences of culture. 
Rarely in his writings and journals did Kirkwood describe adapting to Japanese customs or 
manners. Moreover, while appreciative of the opportunity to observe and study local culture 
there, Kirkwood expressed no desire to adopt any aspect of it in his daily life. With ample 
amenities and support provided amongst the foreign community – usually attained with the 
assistance of bilingual Japanese or long-time foreign residents, who had themselves adopted to 
either the 'western' manners of their employers or to local customs – Kirkwood was not forced to 
adapt to life in Tokyo. Instead, he lived on the assistance of those who adapted to him. He left all 
that was irreconcilably foreign around him outside the ambit of his day to day, ignoring aspects 
of Japan that conflicted with his own sensibilities until he became inspired to observe, record, 
and explain the apparent peculiarities from afar. 
 While Kirkwood began to enjoy a small circle of friends by 1931, the key difference was 
that social obligations assumed among them were completely on his own terms. While still 
submitting to the many social liaison duties of the legation, he combated the boredoms of work 
by embracing the two most prominent non-governmental forces in his life in Tokyo: the natural 
environment and the various aspects of culture available to him in Tokyo. With a small handful 
of young foreigners (often American or British, though he preferred the latter), Kirkwood 
attended concerts and dinners, other times taking his car to explore the nearby regions. One 
characteristic tour occurred in his second summer at the legation when, along with a male 
Japanese staff member, he travelled through the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. The trip 
allowed Kirkwood to escape the office where he had been increasingly taking lunch at his desk, 
busied by the seemingly unending, if menial, tasks demanded by Marler.53 Due to his 
unwillingness to accede to Japanese mores and norms, however, his up close experience with the 
dominant culture of his adopted home was thus bound to his ability to appreciate through 
observation. Fortunately, he found a growing theatre and concert scene that was increasingly 
importing European and North American acts and productions.  
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Rather than abandon his practises of academic research and writing, Kirkwood adapted them to 
fill his new found private, individual time on evenings and weekends. He again put to use skills 
learned as a graduate student at Columbia and in a further attempt to make sense of his 
experiences, Kirkwood looked to learn from those before him. He absorbed every diplomatic 
memoir and biography he could find. He read Baroness Eleanora Mary d'Anethan's Fourteen 
Years of Diplomatic Life in Japan and Mary Crawford Fraser's Letters of a Diplomat's Wife in 
Japan, along with the letters and memoirs of former British Minister to Japan Sir Ernest Satow.54 
He studied the written experiences of the western consuls, missionaries, and sojourners of the 
previous decades, adopting their perspectives, comments, critiques, and methods of 
documentation in order to leave after himself a similar written record. He looked to the 
pantologist "scholar-diplomats" who, under circumstances similar to his own, laboured to 
explain aspects of Japanese and East Asian – or, 'oriental' – traditions and cultures for their 
English-reading audiences back home.55 Language barriers challenged these authors' abilities to 
get close to their subjects – very few were able to converse with locals directly and without 
interpreters. Instead, these scholars and scholar-diplomats based their conclusions on their 
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 These efforts, together with the more widely and determinedly pursued academic endeavours of those Orientalists 
outside the diplomatic profession, comprised the "system of knowledge" Said identified as the "accepted grid for 
filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness." This system at once characterized the central arrangement 
by which power and authority relations between Orientalists and their subjects were founded, along with the ways in 
which these scholars presented their findings to their fellow Occidentals. Said, Orientalism, 5-6. On the role of the 
'scholar-diplomat' in governmental, as well as their anthropological or ethnographical work (much of which the 
present author would argue was indeed of this Orientalist sort) see: J. E. Hoare, "Introduction to Part IV: Scholar 
Diplomats and Consuls," in British Enjoys in Japan, 1859-1972, eds. Hugh Cortazzi et al. (Kent: Global Oriental, 
2004), 219-22. Perhaps no better example of the archetypical Imperial scholar-diplomat was Satow, British 
consulate official at Yokohama for two decades and, later, Minister to Japan from 1895-1900. Among a number 
more works on travel, language, and politics in Japan, Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice was an important 
instruction manual to the professional as well as personal experience of being a diplomat. Satow, Satow's Guide to 
Diplomatic Practice, ed. Lord Gore-Booth, Desmond Pakenham (London: Longman, 1979). On the continued 
importance of Satow's Guide in the training of diplomats around the world today, see: Neumann, 84. 
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distanced observation and a logic derived from western, post-enlightenment conceptions of the 
individual, modernity, and society. They projected their western categories and measurements 
onto their subjects. Kirkwood too had little direct contact with local Japanese residents, though 
this did not deter him from drawing conclusions about Japanese society and its people.56 Relying 
primarily on translated works of national history, as well as English language literature of the 
scholar-diplomats who came before him, Kirkwood produced no fewer than eight manuscripts 
while in Tokyo, including studies of Japanese history, literature, and art.57 
 Kirkwood best demonstrated his interest in the experiences of Westerners who had lived 
in Japan in the decades before him with his book-length biographical study of the life and work 
of Lafcadio Hearn.58 Tracing Hearn's personal and professional life from the time of his 
departure from America in 1889 through his fourteen years in Japan, in Unfamiliar Lafcadio 
Hearn Kirkwood highlighted a number of parallels between Hearn's experience and his own.59 
Hearn was born in the Ionian islands of Greece amidst the Mediterranean, near where Kirkwood 
was some sixty years later when he took his first extended leave from home to work in western 
Turkey.60 The biography opens with Hearn's move from America to Japan in 1890, a trip that 
began with his transcontinental journey aboard the Canadian Pacific Railway. Kirkwood made 
the same trip in 1929. Moreover, as Kirkwood explained, focused primarily on "the important 
                                                 
56
 Kirkwood was essentially illiterate in his early years in Tokyo – he did not begin seriously studying the language 
until about his fourth year in Japan, when it became clear to him that a transfer out was not imminent. His wife 
explains (if somewhat dubiously) that "as soon as he had become more or less fluent" he was transferred to Holland 
in 1939. Christine Kirkwood, "Biographical Note," viii. Moreover, like many of the aforementioned 'diplomat-
scholars' who published monographs and memoirs during or about their time there, fluency in Japanese was often 
self-assessed and not demonstrated or corroborated by Japanese sources. Important exceptions do, of course, exist: 
Satow had a strong ability with the language. Furthermore, in the wake of increased missionary arrival and activity 
in Japan in the late nineteenth- early twentieth century, a new generation white residents, born and educated in Japan 
and skilled in the language, emerged. Amongst their ranks was the important scholar of Japanese history, E. Herbert 
Norman (n. 1909 – ob. 1957) whose works on feudalism in Japan and the history of its political development remain 
highly respected there to this day. 
57
 His largest academic work, completed while living in Japan, was Renaissance in Japan: A Cultural Survey of the 
Seventeenth Century (Tokyo: Meiji Press, 1938). 
58
 International author and teacher, Hearn remains a well known figure in Japan today. In English, see: Sukehiro 
Hirakawa, ed., Lafcadio Hearn in International Perspectives (Kent, CT: Global Oriental LTD, 2007).  
59
 The title is itself homage to both the man, and his work. It is a reference to Hearn's 1895 book Glimpses of 
Unfamiliar Japan. Kirkwood, Unfamiliar Lafcadio Hearn (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1936). 
60
 On the subject of historical as well as contemporaneous Greco-Turkic relations, Kirkwood was an expert. His MA 
thesis at Columbia was "Compulsory Exchange as a Solution of Minority Problems; with special reference to the 
Greco-Turkish exchange of populations," (master's thesis, Columbia, 1927). 
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phase of Hearn's transition from a frustrated career in the West to a career of fulfilment and 
relative happiness in the East," Unfamiliar Lafcadio Hearn was an attempt to describe and 
understand how Hearn adapted to life in Japan.61 Thus, when Kirkwood highlighted in Hearn's 
life the "crucial turning point upon which, so often, success or failure in life depends," he was 
not only speaking of his subject's experiences in Japan, but also his own. By empathizing with 
and illustrating the struggles Hearn faced in adapting to life in Japan, Kirkwood indirectly 
described many of the challenges he felt himself.62 
 
Curating a Legacy: Conclusion 
For a tendency toward self-reflexivity, then, Kirkwood's own character appears in his academic 
writing as in his private works. Indeed, his favourite subject of analysis throughout this period 
remained his self. Self-reflexive material comprises the largest parts of his now public fonds. The 
Kenneth Porter Kirkwood papers, donated in batches to Library and Archives Canada, 
demonstrate the lengths to which the scholar-diplomat Kirkwood went to create a lasting legacy 
and record of his own lived experiences. Between his retirement from External in 1959 and his 
death in 1967 Kirkwood prepared no fewer than three versions of book-length memoirs and a 
volume of vignettes, musings, and epigrams about diplomatic life and its various observed 
practices. These edited accounts, donated to the national public archives in the years after his 
death, reflect an official account that is at once critical as well as sympathetic of the many 
politicians and individuals mentioned in his anecdotes and memories, many of whom were still 
living in the 1970s. These are the products of Kirkwood's desire to leave something for future 
diplomats, civil servants, students, and writers: an arranged, accessible, and, most importantly, 
celebratory image of himself. The mass of papers deposited in 1990, however, adds important 
nuances to these volumes. His original, handwritten journals include the names of individuals 
with whom he was romantic, as well as individuals he thought poorly of – two groups of people 
who do not appear in the typed and edited 'Diplomatic Diaries' versions, for example.  
                                                 
61
 Emphasis is the original. Kirkwood, Unfamiliar Lafcadio Hearn, viii-ix. Smaller sections of the work center upon 
literary criticism, focusing on Hearn's lesser known forays into lyrical and poetic forms of expression. Here 
Kirkwood draws upon his familiarity with critics of the Romantics. The crux of Kirkwood's argument here, however, 
is aimed solely to demonstrate that Hearn did in fact write poetry – an aspect of the writers' practise that was 
relatively unknown at the time. See Ibid., 70-2. 
62
 Ibid., viii-ix. 
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 The only autobiographical work Kirkwood published, however, was The Diplomat at 
Table: A Social and Anecdotal History Through the Looking-Glass. The lack of further 
autobiographical publications was primarily result of his death from cancer in 1968 at age sixty-
nine – his private papers include several boxes of draft chapters and plans for a voluminous work 
about his life. The main themes of The Diplomat at Table, meanwhile, are those of consumption 
and gastronomy. It is through these experiential, social processes that Kirkwood explains 
diplomatic practices and international social and cultural historiographies through the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Anticipating a number of developments in the fields of historical 
research, Kirkwood posited that while "history most often deals with the prosaic narratives of 
politics and statecraft, diplomatic negotiations and treaty-making," his own perceptions of 
history convinced him to "bring into the historical picture of politics and diplomacy some aspect 
of this other side, the social and gastronomic side, as it may be found in social annals, as well as 
in personal experience."63 In explaining this view, he highlighted the very same realms of 
Canadian diplomacy in Japan within which he both established his personal autonomy and 
grounded the passions and identity necessary to his happiness. 
 While he remained dedicated to his official responsibilities as a representative of Canada 
in Japan, after 1930 he increasingly found his passions and fulfillment beyond the professional 
sphere. He realized the effectiveness of this division at Tokyo, reproducing it at his various 
postings thereafter for the remainder of his career while becoming less self-conscious and more 
explicit about these intentions as his life went on. As the source of fulfilment and literary 
productivity in those early years at Tokyo, Kirkwood kept this freedom closely guarded. He used 
the personal autonomy afforded by his diplomatic status to create for himself a place on the 
"sidelines" of diplomatic life – a place where he could observe, think, write, and create much like 
his literary idols had before him.64  
                                                 
63
 "A lifelong diplomat knows only too well that man's gustatory tastes and habits and uses underlie much of the 
business of history," he continues. Kirkwood, The Diplomat at Table, 7. Bread is hereafter linked to narratives of 
revolution. The histories of staple ingredients – namely sugar and wheat – are linked to those of Canadian growth in 
production (A.R.M. Lower's Colony to Nation providing the impetus here). Ibid., 26, 20, 28.  
64
 His term. See, for example: Kirkwood, The Diplomat at Table, 3. Invariably, he remained exposed to the stresses 
that so easily affected his happiness and health. Keenleyside remarked how Kirkwood let "Marler worry him too 
much," the stress causing the already slender young officer to grow "thinner than ever." These observations 
regarding the mental and physical health of Kirkwood he made upon return from a month long fact-finding tour 
during which time Kirkwood was placed in charge of the legation in both Keenleyside and his minister's absence. In 
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 Kirkwood's Tokyo writings, composed in the late hours of the evening in that private 
space he so valued, remain the single most comprehensive look into Tokyo's diplomatic society 
as experienced by a Canadian representative from this late-interwar period. Kirkwood's works 
meanwhile reveal their creator's desire to be remembered, looked-up to, and studied by the 
students and gentleman-scholars he envisioned would lead the world for future generations. His 
obsession with leaving this legacy meanwhile influenced the way he wrote about cultures, the 
company he kept, and the way he observed the world. Cultivating his personal, recorded identity, 
Kirkwood never limited himself to the particularities of Canadian party politics. In public life, he 
chose not to personify the parliament or policies his fellow Canadians had selected back home. 
Instead, he was a sponge that soaked in the foreign and decoded from it meaning before 
returning it to the page for an imagined, future (and always 'western') audience. 
 Kirkwood's profound respect for the written word, and the power and stature of the 
legacies of men, however romanticized, directed his thoughts and actions in Tokyo more than 
any allegiances to political or societal forces. For the purposes of the Department of External 
Affairs, this meant that Kirkwood saw himself as a fact-finder – a researcher providing the 
information that would allow his government to produce the appropriate policy. What he truly 
valued about the position was the sense of adventure and the opportunity to travel and observe 
foreign societies. As a result of the individual autonomy afforded to Canadian diplomats in 
Tokyo in the early 1930s, Kirkwood was able to occupy his place on the sidelines. And it was 
from there that he utilized his privileged gaze and education to critically assess and record the 
various moments of high diplomacy and international exchange comprising Canada's first 
diplomatic mission to Japan. 
 While his minister, Herbert Marler, saw Tokyo as a stage from which to promote 
Canadian exports and his first secretary, Hugh Keenleyside, saw it as one from which to perform 
Canadian political autonomy, Kirkwood envisioned Tokyo as a series of opportunities to develop 
and reflect upon the self. Although certain challenges kept him from doing so in his first year 
there, by 1931 he had harnessed the individual agencies afforded by diplomatic status in this era 
                                                                                                                                                             
a supplementary note, appended by Keenleyside to this 1930 diary entry and reprinted in his memoir, Keenleyside 
added the following: "I once described Ken in a bathing suit as being so thin that a praying mantis would look 
corpulent in comparison." Keenleyside, Hammer the Golden Day, 392, 393n9. 
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to carve out an autonomous realm for his self, right alongside that which the legation had created 




In his seminal manual of modern international relations, Sir Ernest Satow wrote, "diplomacy is 
the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the 
governments of independent states."1 Ignoring for a moment the varying levels of importance 
observers and analysts of international relations have placed upon the state in the decades since 
Satow, the process of states officially exchanging individual representatives has been, and 
remains, the product of efforts to apply the intelligence and tact Satow described. The 
experiences of those individuals sent abroad are meanwhile indicative of the national, political, 
and cultural identities their governments sent them to represent and perform. Moreover, the 
forces driving Keenleyside, Marler, and Kirkwood's self-perceptions and processes of 
identification in Tokyo after 1929 paralleled those that challenged critical observers across the 
Dominion in the lead up to the Statute of Westminster. Like many Canadians, these three 
diplomats reflected upon questions regarding the idea of autonomy within empire, the place of 
Canada within a changing Commonwealth, as well as its place within a global community of 
nation-states. Just as there would be no consensus amongst Canadians regarding Canadian 
national identity, autonomy, and its international role, neither had Canada's first three 
representatives to Japan achieved amongst themselves any consensus on these issues.  
 With the opening of the Tokyo legation in 1929, Canada's Department of External Affairs 
forged ahead with a claim for autonomy, laying claim to a physical and political presence in a 
part of the world far removed from the traditional strongholds of Western political power and the 
successively British and American global political hegemonies. Yet, after the initial plans were 
finalized, King and Skelton left the operation of the legation in the hands of the three ranking 
officials posted there. This hands-off approach amplified disparities amongst the individuals of 
its staff, meanwhile raising the stakes of the offices' own autonomy within that larger push for 
separate and specifically Canadian representation abroad. As demonstrated by the distinct 
experiences of the three Canadian representatives to Tokyo after 1929, there was room within 
this newly claimed space for each to negotiate, rationalize, internalize, and perform his self-
identified role in the Japanese capital. This was possible without compromising the effectiveness 
of their mission, nor their ability to project a national, Canadian image into Japan and greater 
                                                 
1
 Satow, Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice, 3. 
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East Asia. Thus, from within a Canadian institution on the far side of the Pacific were reflected 
the identities of three men of distinct geographical, political, and social backgrounds. 
 First Secretary Hugh Keenleyside, the legation's autonomist-academic, embodied Skelton 
and King's vision of a Canadian debut on the Pacific stage while balancing this work with 
retreats away from the office with family and non-state organizations. Canadian Minister to 
Japan Herbert Meredith Marler's conflicted imperialist-nationalism demonstrated how tensions 
surrounding the nation's past, present, and future troubled its fading classes of urban patricians. 
His experiences in East Asia also showed how expanded initiatives in managing Canada's 
foreign policy at once bolstered and challenged a patrician's individual claims to authority and 
privilege. Marler's personal finances and status, meanwhile, ensured that the first Canadian 
diplomatic institution in Japan and East Asia remained comparable and capable of standing on its 
own alongside an established foreign presence there. Finally, Second Secretary Kenneth P. 
Kirkwood's forays in literature, travel, and (however reluctantly) international politics 
demonstrated a third space within the legation and the diplomatic corps in Tokyo – a space that 
allowed the inquisitive adventurer to indulge his self-interest and adapt the privileges of 
diplomatic authority to wholly personal ends. For all their differences, however, Keenleyside, 
Marler, and Kirkwood nevertheless introduced their ideas of Canada to the world in a way never 
before seen in East Asia and the Pacific. For these reasons, their respective experiences, 
understandings, and performance of roles in Tokyo indicate the heterogeneity of even the most 
privileged stratum of interwar Canadian society.  
 The Canadian legation to Tokyo was therefore not simply a triumphant moment for 
Canadian autonomists seeking to retrieve the reins of the Dominion's foreign policy from its 
former colonial and imperial leader. While the three Canadians were stationed there to claim and 
exercise this triumph of autonomy, they undertook three separate exercises in individual 
autonomy and self-identification, exercises which, as we have seen, were important to the very 
formation of that institution and, consequently, the way in which Canada was seen in Japan and 
around the world. Though living and working as representatives of a single nation, the Canadian 
diplomats in Tokyo after 1929 each enjoyed personal freedoms to negotiate, internalize, and 
perform their role as the combined result of individual privilege, prestige, and manoeuvring. It 
was these varying forms and degrees of personal autonomy that made collective efforts to 
exercise a Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs possible. 
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 Thus, and in spite of much of the extant literature on Canadian foreign policy from this 
period, the lives and work of Canada's first three diplomats in the Pacific from 1929 represented 
not only the politics of that nation's first experiment in an autonomous foreign policy, but also a 
number other socio-cultural trends of transnational origin, importance, and impact. Free from the 
hegemonic influences of the long established structures in power of Western Europe and Atlantic 
world foreign relations, conditions in East Asia benefitted these newcomers. Furthermore, in 
1929, the inevitability of Japanese aggression on the continent, or any multi-lateral warfare 
amongst nations present in that region, was far from the minds of diplomats there. While the 
institution established by Keenleyside in May 1929 ostensibly projected and represented a single 
national identity, the experiences of its three ranking officers reflected disparities so common 
amongst even the affluent, urban, white, male Canadian populations of the period – disparities 
unbridled, if only for a few months or years, by such omnipresent concerns as a global economic 
depression, or a second world war.. Thus, such theological explanations such as the road to war 
narrative, so often adopted from Atlantic histories of this decade and applied to East Asia, have 
here been circumvented to reveal a more intricate history of interpersonal and ad-hoc relations 
and exchanges.  
 The present study contributes to trends that have already instigated the birth of a new 
diplomatic history in Canada – one that does not uncritically accept such constructions as nation, 
nationality, or the various political institutions therein. Within this new diplomatic history is 
contained the concerns and questions of both the familiar and established political historical 
tradition, as well as those of the more recently established social and cultural histories. By taking 
these three diplomats as main subjects of analysis, the present study has borrowed from and 
embraced these developments. Finally, by eschewing the top-down analysis that has so 
characterized political and diplomatic history in Canada, the present application of biography as 
history highlights the usefulness of historical biography beyond traditional application to 
comparatively revered or famous individuals of the past. 
 In 2010, Canadian political historian Adam Chapnick argued that "the relative paucity of 
scholarship on the history of [Canadian] foreign relations has resulted in a dearth of views."2 By 
investigating the individual yet parallel experiences of the three men who managed the creation a 
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completely new Canadian governmental institution in a region previously untouched by that 
nation's diplomats, I have provided one new perspective. There remain, of course, many more 
views yet to be recovered and examined. Meanwhile, the growing importance of the Pacific 
world demands that we continue to take note of not only contemporary moments of transnational 
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